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SMALL SUBURBS, LARGE LOTS: HOW THE SCALE OF LAND-USE
REGULATION AFFECTS HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, EQUITY,
AND THE CLIMATE
Eric Biber,* Giulia Gualco-Nelson,** Nicholas Marantz,*** and Moira O’Neill****
Abstract
Housing costs in major coastal metropolitan areas nationwide have
skyrocketed, impacting people, the economy, and the environment. Landuse regulation, controlled primarily at the local level, plays a major role
in determining housing production. In response to this mounting housing
crisis, scholars, policymakers, and commentators are debating whether
greater state involvement in local land-use decision-making is the best
path forward.
We argue here that there are good reasons to believe that continuing
on the current path—with local control of land-use regulation as it is—
will lead to persistent underproduction of housing. The benefits of housing
production are primarily regional, including improved job markets,
increased socioeconomic mobility, and reduced greenhouse gas
emissions. But the costs associated with producing more housing are often
local, felt at the neighborhood level. Local governments whose voters are
impacted by the local negative impacts of housing and will usually have
less incentive to consider those regional, and national, benefits and
approve housing. Recent political science, planning, economics, and legal
research shows that smaller local jurisdictions tend to produce less
housing, and when political institutions decentralize control over housing
to the sublocal (e.g., neighborhood) scale, less housing is approved.
A central theory in academic research in land-use regulation and
local government law has been the idea that competition among highly
fragmented local governments can produce more efficient outcomes in
public services and land-use regulation, even if there may be significant
inequities across local jurisdictions in outcomes. Our analysis shows that
this theory no longer accurately describes how fragmented local
governance affects economic efficiency. Indeed, our analysis makes clear
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that fragmented local governance is both inequitable and inefficient, at
least in the context of land-use regulation. Our analysis also raises
questions about local government law scholarship contending that
increased local governmental power can effectively address the
dysfunctions of metropolitan areas in the United States.
We present a range of policy proposals to address the problems we
identify. First, greater state intervention in local land-use regulation is
necessary. While a greater state role need not (and probably should not)
entirely displace local control, it is essential to ensure that the larger-scale
benefits of housing are appropriately considered. Second, we note that the
highly fragmented local land-use regulatory system imposes challenges
for housing production, in part, because variation among local regulatory
practices creates barriers to entry for new housing across jurisdictions.
Accordingly, we advocate for a state role to increase the standardization
of local land-use regulatory tools as a key step to help advance greater
housing production, even where local control is maintained.
INTRODUCTION
For decades housing costs in major coastal metropolitan areas around the
United States have skyrocketed, impacting people, the economy, and the
environment. By the late 2010s, housing costs reached levels that priced out lowerand middle-income renters from their homes and excluded millions more from
moving into these metropolitan areas that have been the drivers for growth and
opportunity in the United States. Some residents pushed to the exurban fringe now
face megacommutes. At the same time, when high housing costs exclude people—
disproportionately people of color—from neighborhoods with high levels of
opportunity in the form of excellent schools, good job opportunities, high-quality
public services, and low crime, this perpetuates entrenched racial inequities in the
United States.
Preventing people from moving into high-growth, high-productivity
metropolitan areas also harms regional and national economic growth. The
economic costs of exclusion to the United States in these metropolitan areas may be
as high as $1.4 trillion.1 Moreover, addressing the present and future threats of
climate change requires reducing greenhouse gas emissions around the world,
including in the United States. A large portion of American greenhouse gas
emissions come from transportation, and a major component of transportation
emissions in the United States comes from the use of gasoline for passenger vehicles.

1

Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations Smother the U.S.
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/opinion/hous
ing-regulations-us-economy.html [https://perma.cc/U4G4-BWMF].
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At present, reducing greenhouse gas emissions depends in part on reducing
transportation emissions by increasing the ability of people to walk, bike, or public
transit.2
Addressing all of these issues requires more housing in high opportunity
neighborhoods within major metropolitan neighborhoods or infill development.
More housing supply can reduce the cost of housing overall in a metropolitan area;
locating that housing supply in high opportunity neighborhoods can support racial
and class integration; lowering barriers to entry in the most economically dynamic
metropolitan areas can support social mobility and national economic productivity;
and producing infill housing can reduce the need for automobiles for transportation
and increase other forms of transit.3 In particular, scholars and policymakers have
identified encouraging development in single-family and other low-density
neighborhoods in older and newer suburbs around metropolitan areas as a key step
to address these four issues.4
But encouraging development in these single-family and other low-density
neighborhoods depends on decisions made by city councils, town halls, and county
boards of supervisors around the country. Most land-use regulation in the United
States is adopted and implemented by general-purpose local governments, such as
towns and cities. These local governments often manage extremely small areas of
land, producing a highly fragmented governance landscape for most of the major
metropolitan areas in the United States. For instance, in the Bay Area, there are 110
local governments with land-use regulatory powers in a metropolitan area of 7.75

2

See, e.g., California Air Resources Board, California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping
Plan, at 74–77 (Nov. 2017) (stating that reductions in vehicle miles travelled (VMT) are
required to achieve state climate goals); id. (“While most of the [greenhouse gas emission]
reductions from the transportation sector in this Scoping Plan will come from technologies
and low carbon fuels, a reduction in the growth of VMT is also needed. VMT reductions are
necessary to achieve the 2030 target and must be part of any strategy evaluated in this Plan.”).
3
Identifying production as a key response to both housing costs and residential
segregation does not mean that it is the only important or even necessary response. Other
steps such as protection of tenants from displacement and preservation of existing affordable
housing are essential as well, as has been recognized by policymakers and advocates in
places such as California. See The Committee to House the Bay Area, CASA Compact: A 15Year Emergency Policy Package to Confront the Housing Crisis in the San Francisco Bay
Area (Jan. 2019), https://mtc.ca.gov/sites/default/files/CASA_Compact.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X9NC-698C].
4
See, e.g., Michael Manville, Paavo Monkkonen & Michael Lens, It’s Time to End
Single Family Zoning, 86 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 1, 108–09 (2020); Jake Wegmann, Death to
Single-Family Zoning . . . and New Life to the Missing Middle, 86 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 1,
115 (2020); CONOR DOUGHERTY, GOLDEN GATES: FIGHTING FOR HOUSING IN AMERICA
117–44 (2020) (describing motivations by state legislators in California to push for denser
zoning in urban areas); Laura Bliss, Oregon’s Single-Family Zoning Ban Was a ‘Long Time
Coming,’ BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2019, 7:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2019-07-02/upzoning-rising-oregon-bans-single-family-zoning [https://perma.cc/5Q3MU6E8] (describing legislation in Oregon requiring cities to allow dense multifamily housing).
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million people.5 As of 2010, there were 565 general-purpose local governments with
land-use regulatory authority in the New York metropolitan area for 18.9 million
people, despite the existence of the large consolidated five-borough New York City
government, and in the Boston metropolitan area, there were 197 such governments
for 4.55 million people.6
The fragmentation of local government in the United States creates the
possibility that one local government’s decisions about land-use regulation can have
spillover effects on other local governments.7 Production of housing in a particular
location has broader regional and national benefits—it contributes to lower housing
costs at the regional level since housing markets are regional, not just local. Those
lower housing costs can, in turn, produce several benefits at the regional and national
level: fostering economic growth in high productivity metropolitan areas; providing
affordable housing that creates access for low-income and historically
disadvantaged groups in high opportunity neighborhoods and metropolitan areas;
and mitigating climate change by facilitating the development of dense infill
neighborhoods that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Development, in contrast, typically produces local, concentrated costs.
Increased burdens on local public goods (in particular schools), increased traffic,
reduced access to parking, and other impacts from denser residential development
5

There are 101 incorporated cities and towns and nine counties in the Bay Area. See
Egon Terplan, Strengthening the Bay Area’s Regional Governance, 2 (2013),
https://www.spur.org/sites/default/files/publications_pdfs/Strengthening_Regional_Govern
ance.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW7K-H83C].
6
The two metropolitan areas analyzed are the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long
Island, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area and the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Metro Area.
General purpose local governments are typically classified by the Census Bureau as places,
county subdivisions, and/or counties. We classify census geographies as general purpose
local governments with land-use regulatory authority based on each geography’s federal
information processing standards (FIPS) class code, as recorded in geographic information
system shapefiles provided by the US Census Bureau and the IPUMS National Historical
GIS program, combined with data from other sources as described in Nicholas J. Marantz &
Paul G. Lewis, Jurisdictional Size and Residential Development: Are Large Scale Local
Governments More Receptive to Multifamily Housing?, URB. AFFS. REV., Jan. 23, 2021, at
1, 5–7. Population statistics are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 1
DATASET (2011), https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2010/dec/summary-file-1.html
[https://perma.cc/5NVT-P8S4].
7
For prior researchers noting the possible issue of spillovers in land-use regulation, see,
for example, Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000)
[hereinafter Briffault, Localism and Regionalism]; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 86–87 (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS]; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning
Budget,” 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 81, 90–94 (2011) [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher,
Balancing the “Zoning Budget”]; Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary
Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1133–41 (1996) [hereinafter
Briffault, Boundary Problem]. We analyze the literature in more detail in Sections III.A and
B.
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will generally be realized at the neighborhood scale or the level of an individual
local government. In many cases, these costs will be higher for local governments
when new housing is more affordable and denser. The implication of this asymmetry
in the geographic scale is that local control over land use will focus on the smaller
scale, negative impacts of housing development, and underweight the larger scale,
positive impacts of that development. Thus, local control over land-use regulation
should underproduce housing in high-cost, highly fragmented metropolitan areas.
Providing at least initial support for this assessment is the fact that local land-use
regulation in many metropolitan areas is highly restrictive in terms of what
residential development it allows—a major contributor to skyrocketing housing
costs, residential segregation, and unsustainable sprawling development. Moreover,
local governments, particularly small suburban local governments, are politically
dominated by homeowners who seek to protect home values by restricting the
construction of dense infill development.
Increasingly there is evidence to support this critique of local control over land
use. Research in law, economics, and urban planning has found extensive evidence
that housing production and restrictions on housing production in one jurisdiction
impact the cost of housing in other jurisdictions at the regional level.8 Research has
found evidence that highly fragmented local government structures facilitate
sprawling, low-density patterns of growth. This research has found evidence that
smaller local governments have stricter zoning that excludes dense, lower-cost
housing. It has found evidence that smaller jurisdictions produce less housing
overall. And it has found that even within larger local governments, where land-use
regulation decisions are devolved to smaller units of control (such as city
councilmembers or neighborhood groups), less housing overall is produced.
This evidence is a powerful argument for greater state or regional roles in landuse regulation. In other words, reducing local control of land-use regulation should
advance housing production that can address housing costs, residential segregation,
and the climate crisis. Thus, our analysis also rebuts proponents of the primacy of
local control of land-use regulation, proponents who have resisted state-level efforts
to advance dense, infill housing production in states such as California.
There are important theoretical payoffs from our analysis as well. One key
theoretical framework in both land-use and local government law involves the
possibility that competition among highly fragmented local governments might
produce more efficient local government and more efficient outcomes from land-use
regulation. In particular, some economists and legal scholars have posited that such
competition reduces housing costs by incentivizing local governments to advance
the socially optimal amount of public services and development.9 This argument,
8

See infra Parts II and III.
See, for example, FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, for
economist theories. For legal scholar theories, see, for example, Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Planning for Density: Promises, Perils, and a Paradox, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 11
(2017) [hereinafter Garnett, Planning for Density]; Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling
Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1905, 1906, 1908,
9
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which builds on an economic analysis of local government developed by economist
Charles Tiebout in the mid-twentieth century,10 is also one of the arguments used to
support the status quo of local control over land in the United States.11 Some
academics have speculated that unified regional or state-level control of land-use
regulation might, in fact, undermine housing production, since it would create a
governmental entity with monopolistic control over land-use regulation that is
vulnerable to capture by those who might fight housing production and seek to keep
housing prices high.12 More fundamentally, an influential thread of economics
research asserts that strong zoning controls on the influx of new residents into a
jurisdiction are an essential feature of Tiebout competition, at least so long as
property taxes continue to be the dominant approach for local government finance
in the United States.13
Tiebout competition has always focused on efficiency rather than equity—as
even proponents would concede. The merits of this tradeoff are and have always
been problematic. However, our analysis indicates it is unclear whether there is even
a major efficiency gain from Tiebout competition—if small, fragmented local
governments do not adequately consider the regional or national benefits of housing
production, then they will not provide the efficient level of that housing. One of the
most important implications of Tiebout competition has been that it could advance
efficient provision of public services by local government more generally, such as
schools, policing, and public utilities. However, maintaining these services comes at
a cost. High-quality public schools—traditionally a beacon of suburban America—
require a population that can pay for those services through higher taxes and
assessments. Efficient Tiebout competition in these contexts may well depend on
the ability of local governments to wield land-use regulation to exclude low- and
moderate-income outsiders from entering the jurisdiction, to take advantage of highquality public services. Under these circumstances, exclusionary zoning is a crucial
component of putatively efficient intergovernmental competition. This has clear
equity implications, as exclusionary zoning will preclude lower-income residents
from moving to communities with high-quality public services. But there are
efficiency implications as well. Dense housing, the kind that exclusionary zoning is
most likely to preclude, has regional economic and global climate benefits. And
because of the large-scale of those benefits that extend beyond the borders of many
1915 (2010) [hereinafter Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership] (reviewing LEE ANNE
FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009));
Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 883, 899–900 (2007) [hereinafter Serkin, Local Property Law]; Vicki Been,
“Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
10
See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) [hereinafter Tiebout, Local Expenditures].
11
See infra Section II.C. (discussing arguments for local control over land-use).
12
See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 3, 409, 434–35 (1977) [hereinafter Ellickson, Suburban Growth].
13
See infra notes 163–166, and accompanying text.
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local jurisdictions, local governments will not have strong incentives—and indeed
may have strong disincentives—to allow dense housing.
Our analysis provides an important contribution to the scholarship on land use
and local government, as well as to the urban planning and economics literatures.
Scholars have previously identified the possibility that local governments might not
have adequate incentives to produce housing for metropolitan regions because of the
mismatch between the scale of local government and the scale of metropolitan
housing markets, and that smaller jurisdictions may be particularly reluctant to
adequately permit sufficient housing to meet regional needs.14 Scholars have
previously noted the importance of rising housing costs to regional and national
economies15 and the importance of infill development to address climate change.16
There is ample literature debating the merits and demerits of Tiebout competition as
an accurate portrayal of how local governments in the United States function and as
a normatively desirable outcome, including in the context of land-use regulation.17
14

See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 52 (3rd ed. 2000); Sheryll D.
Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the
Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2004–14 (2000) (outlining the bias intrinsic
to local governance); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 426–29 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism Part II]
(highlighting the issues of size with respect to local governments and boundary formation);
Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7, at 18–20 (arguing that “a purely localist
governance structure will fail to provide some of the critical elements of the efficiency
model”); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND REGULATION,
314–16 (2015) [hereinafter FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!] (addressing the regional variances in
local governments); Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 402–03 (discussing the
various effects of antigrowth policies); John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use
Preemption Amid a Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV. 823, 830–35 (2019); Kenneth A. Stahl,
Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 191–93; see also
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN,
LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 65–67 (5th ed. 2020) (noting this dynamic of
local government underproviding housing because of the broader benefits of limited
housing). Ellickson, Been, Hills, and Serkin indicate that this dynamic is “difficult to verify.”
Id. at 67. Our synthesis here provides what we believe to be the best summary of the evidence
that does verify that this dynamic exists.
15
See, e.g., Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial
Misallocation, 11 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONS. 1 (2019) (examining national effects of
housing constraints and spatial misallocation); David Schleicher, The City as a Law and
Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 1534 (2010) [hereinafter Schleicher, The City as
a Subject] (noting regional effects of agglomeration gains).
16
See infra Section IV.B.
17
For classic scholarship by the advocates of the role of Tiebout competition, see
VINCENT OSTROM, ROBERT BISH & ELINOR OSTROM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (1988); MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SUBURBIA (1989); Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout & Robert Warren, The Organization
of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831,
832 (1961) [hereinafter Ostrom et al., Government in Metropolitan Areas]. For key work
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Scholars such as David Schleicher have questioned whether Tiebout competition
can adequately function in a world in which a few key metropolitan areas
increasingly dominate economic output.18 However, this piece is the first to both
combine these disparate strands of the literature and summarize the results of recent
economics, planning, and political science literature that provides quantitative
evidence of how smaller jurisdictions disproportionately fail to produce adequate
housing; and it takes this summary to provide a comprehensive critique of the use
of Tiebout competition to describe or justify land-use regulation by local
governments.
While legal scholarship based on Tiebout competition emphasizes the ability
of local governments to make policy decisions that can facilitate choices by
residents, other local government law scholars have argued that local governments
in the United States are in fact hamstrung by state limits on their policymaking
powers—including in the context of land-use decision-making.19 Local government
scholars have argued that these trends have accelerated in the past several years with
the “new preemption” in which states have moved to significantly constrict local
government regulatory powers.20 Some of these scholars have called for both
expanding local government powers and for more robust protections of local
government autonomy.21 Limiting local land-use regulatory powers might threaten
critiquing Tiebout competition, frequently on equity grounds, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999); PETER DREIER, JOHN
MOLLENKOPF & TODD SWANSTROM, PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2001); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); NEAL R. PEIRCE, CITISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA
CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993); RUSK, supra note 14; Briffault, Our
Localism Part II, supra note 14, at 415–35 (refuting the localist theory of governance). We
expand on this theoretical discussion in Sections II.C and III.A, infra.
18
See Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 3 (2012); Schleicher, The City as a Subject, supra note 15, at 1535–45.
19
See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2005)
[hereinafter Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule]; GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY
BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008); see also RICHARD SCHRAGGER,
CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 60–86 (2016) [hereinafter
SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER] (explaining that cities are subordinated to the free market and
that “competitive decentralization is intended to limit cities” instead of empowering them).
20
See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995,
1995 (2018) [hereinafter Briffault, New Preemption]; Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of
Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954, 954 (2019); Paul A. Diller, The
Political Process of Preemption, 54 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 343, 343 (2020); Erin Adele
Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J.
1469, 1469 (2018); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV.
1163, 1163 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, Attack].
21
See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 2017–25; Barron, Reclaiming Home
Rule, supra note 19, at 2364–79; FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 211–12 (introducing
proposals in context of land-use regulation); see also NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES
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other important local regulatory powers without the intended payoff if “there is no
reason to believe that a state’s land use regime . . . will not come to reflect similar
political pathologies” as at the local level.22
Our analysis provides one response to the skepticism that reducing even some
local control over land use would provide better outcomes. We identify a specific
mechanism, limited to land-use regulation, that predicts local governments will
usually under-provide housing relative to larger scales of regulation, such as at the
regional or state level, because of the positive spillovers of housing.23 Our analysis
is limited to land use and therefore does not threaten other areas of local regulation,
nor does it provide support for the blanket or punitive forms of state intervention
described in the “new preemption” literature. Our analysis does provide a theoretical
grounding for an expectation that at least some states will, on average, provide
regulation that is more effective in producing needed housing.
Our analysis also makes a theoretical contribution to property law more
broadly. A key effect of local control over land-use regulation is that the regulatory
process is extremely complicated and highly variable from place to place. It is timeand resource-intensive for a landowner or developer to identify what the processes
for development are and how to navigate them to fruition. This adds costs to
development and increases barriers to entry for developers who seek to produce
residential housing in a city where they have not worked in the past. The complexity
and diversity of land-use regulatory forms across local jurisdictions also facilitate
evasion by local governments of state-level efforts to advance housing production,
as local governments adopt new forms of regulation to evade state-level restrictions
and mandates. Property scholars have emphasized how the creation of standardized
forms can facilitate the transfer and use of property, but their work has focused on
property (i.e., private law) rather than land-use regulation (i.e., public law).24
Standardization of land-use regulatory tools and terms—limiting local governments
to a specified menu of regulatory options in developing their zoning systems—could
have analogous benefits. By enabling land-use regulation that is predictable and
comprehensible to landowners and the public, reducing development costs and
barriers to entry, and limiting the ability of local governments to evade housing
production mandates, standardization could play a crucial role in facilitating the
HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 26 (2020) (group of leading local government
scholars calling for a “substantial state interest” that is “narrowly tailored” for any state
preemption of local power); id. at 26, 35, 53 (calling for presumption of local power).
22
Richard C. Schragger, The Perils of Land Use Deregulation, U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schragger, Perils].
See also id. at 22 (“But few have sought to explain why, if local governments are unwilling
to jettison their exclusionary tendencies, state elected officials would do it for them.”)
(citation omitted).
23
Local government scholars regularly note that spillovers across local government
boundaries can justify state-level intervention. See, e.g., Briffault, New Preemption, supra
note 20, at 2021; NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 21, at 18, 26.
24
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (2000).
OF
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production of residential housing.25 It also could have important benefits by making
the land-use regulatory system easier for the public to understand—allowing them
to hold developers and policymakers accountable for how well or inadequately that
system operates.
We do not underestimate the political challenges our proposals for change may
face. But we emphasize the urgency of addressing these issues: millions of
Americans who have lost their homes or are excluded from areas of economic
opportunity; the lasting harms from historical and present residential segregation;
and the looming climate crisis.
We begin our analysis in Part I with an overview of how the land-use regulatory
process in America operates in the context of fragmented local government
structures; we also provide a history of how land use and local government have
functioned to structure the rise of the suburbs in the United States, including
residential segregation; and we describe current policy debates over local control of
land use.
In Part II, we describe the theory and evidence for regional spillovers for
housing development by local governments. We explain how the negative impacts
of housing development are likely to be smaller in geographic scale than the positive
impacts of that development and how this would likely lead small local governments
to underproduce housing. We summarize recent research that supports the idea that
housing production in one jurisdiction has spillover effects on other jurisdictions and
that smaller local governments produce less housing than larger local governments.
In Part III, we summarize the larger scale (national or global) spillovers from
housing production. Economists have argued that increasing access to highproductivity metropolitan areas will likely produce significant economic benefits at
a national level. Increasing this kind of access to high-opportunity neighborhoods
would address historical and present-day racial and other socioeconomic inequities
in access to public goods and education. And we note the global climate benefits
from facilitating dense infill development that depends less on automobile
transportation.
In Part IV, we explore the implications of our analysis. We discuss the basics
of Tiebout theory and the relevance of our analysis for that theory. In particular, we
note that spillovers raise serious questions about the efficiency benefits of Tiebout
competition among local governments, at least in the housing context. Those
questions about the efficiency of competition might apply more broadly to a wider
range of public service provision by local governments, at least to the extent that
efficiency depends on the exclusion of potential future residents, as indicated by
some of the theoretical economics literature. We also discuss the implications of our
work for local government scholars who have argued for greater powers for local
25
See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable
City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2015) [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher, Affordable City]
(arguing that land-use and property scholars should analyze land-use law similar to the way
they analyze common law property rules, which are less relevant today, and calling for
greater standardization and certainty in land-use law because that will help accomplish goals
of transferability and development of property).

2022]

SMALL SUBURBS, LARGE LOTS

11

governments to control land use and other policy areas, noting that our story
complicates such calls. We then explore important policy implications. Our analysis
supports greater state or regional involvement in land-use regulation, as opposed to
the local control paradigm that has been dominant in the United States for the last
century. It also identifies standardization of land-use regulation as a key reform that
could advance housing production.
I. THE DEBATE OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATION AND ITS IMPACT
ON LAND-USE REGULATION
A. Primer on Land-Use Law and Local Government
The basic framework of land-use regulation in the United States is zoning—a
local government puts land into zones that determine the uses and densities that can
be developed—sometimes called “base zoning.”26 For instance, a zone might restrict
development to residential uses (excluding commercial and industrial uses) and
prohibit any structures that are over two stories in height or that have more than five
units of housing in them. As zoning has developed, the restrictions on densities, in
particular, have become more complicated and more varied.27 A development
project that can occur as a permitted use within the zone is often called a “by right”
project because, in theory, it should require no additional approvals. The base zoning
is set by the local government’s legislative body (e.g., a city council or county board
of supervisors) and can be altered by that legislative body in a process known as
rezoning. Crucially, because rezoning is a legislative process, it is one that gives
great discretion to the local government in decision-making.
Some uses may be permitted in some zones through special review processes
that require public hearings and specific findings. Most common is the “conditional
use permit” (or an equivalent permit with a different name), in which the local
jurisdiction must provide specific approval for that use to occur in that zone. For
instance, some residential zones may allow commercial uses as a conditional use—
with the local government requiring findings on various criteria to determine
whether a particular use is appropriate in a particular place. Another special review
process available to allow otherwise prohibited projects under the base zoning is a
variance. Variances in many jurisdictions provide only for exemptions from limited
provisions of the zoning regulations, such as setback requirements, so they are not
usually available to allow a use that would otherwise be prohibited.28 Like
26

Moira O’Neill, Giulia Gualco-Nelson & Eric Biber, Sustainable Communities or the
Next Urban Renewal?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1061, 1087 (2020).
27
Variations include setback requirements (limits on development near property lines),
floor-to-area ratio requirements (limits on the ratio of habitable space in buildings to the total
area of the lot containing the building), and open space requirements (requiring a certain
amount of outdoor space for each unit in a building).
28
For example, California prohibits many cities from issuing variances from use
regulations. However, some states, such as New York, allow use variances. See Otto v.
Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y 1939).
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conditional use permits, variances generally involve specific findings that must be
made by the local government. Crucially, both conditional use permits and variances
generally require an exercise of judgment by local governments as to whether a
project should be permitted.
Local governments may overlay base zoning with additional review procedures
that might require hearings and/or additional findings. For instance, many local
governments have adopted design or architectural review, in which a review board
must approve the design of a project before it can be approved. Design review
standards are often quite general (e.g., requiring findings as to compatibility of the
design with neighboring buildings) and can even apply to projects that might
otherwise be “by right” under the base zoning.29
Cumulatively, discretionary review requirements can ensure that almost all
projects must go through some sort of process in which the local decision-makers
have the power to reject any development they want.30 The legislative decisionmaking process for rezoning and flexible zoning techniques can allow a legislature
to prohibit development for almost any reason;31 conditional use permits and
variances usually have general enough standards that allow for the rejection of a
project based on vague reasons such as neighborhood compatibility;32 and design
review also usually has generally framed standards that allow local governments to
reject almost any project.33
The power to “say no” gives the local government leverage in negotiations with
developers or landowners, as well as power to respond to pressures from
constituents.34 Leverage over developers may be important for local governments
29
BRIAN BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING INVITATIONS
TO ABUSE OF DISCRETION xvii (15th ed. 2012) (noting that design codes increasingly involve

subjective standards); id. at 13 (“Architectural design review ordinances provide some of the
worst examples of vague statements of purpose and overbroad standards that invite abuse.
Such ordinances frequently lack sufficiently clear standards and vest too much subjective
decision making in the architectural review board officials.”).
30
CLIFFORD L. WEAVER & RICHARD F. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND
FUTURE FRONTIER 258 (1979) (“The growth of discretion in suburban zoning was . . .
attributable to the need to respond to complex proposals and situations and to the desire to
preserve the right to say no.”).
31
BLAESSER, supra note 29, at 254–56, 262 (describing how floating zone and rezoning
procedures give discretion and leverage to local government).
32
See id. at xvi (noting that many of the discretionary provisions involve “community
character” components that are highly subjective); id. at 249 (“Municipal attorneys
frequently advise their municipal clients to keep standards and conditions for certain types
of land use approvals deliberately vague. In this way, the municipality can extract a larger
number of amenities during the negotiation process in exchange for the approval.”).
33
Id. at 440–47.
34
Ira Michael Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, in
13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 183 (1972); RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME:
MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 53–54 (1966) (noting the importance of delay and
uncertainty that stem from discretionary decision-making in raising costs for developers and
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concerned about the fiscal impacts of developments35 Constituents may seek to have
control over the nature and form of development in their neighborhoods, and a veto
power for local government gives them that power.36
Discretionary review has other important implications for our purposes. It
generally (though not always) is associated with a higher likelihood of a public
hearing for the approval of a project. Hearings are a key entry point into the
regulatory process for neighbors and other stakeholders, and therefore can facilitate
delay and obstruction to development projects.37 In contrast, “by right” review
should not have a public hearing since it simply requires basic determinations of
whether a project meets clearly delineated standards. Discretionary review at the
local level can be the key trigger determining whether state-level environmental
review requirements apply, which themselves will often trigger public hearing
requirements.

giving local government leverage over them); BLAESSER, supra note 29, at 7–9 (describing
how local governments convert as of right “permitted” uses to conditional uses in order to
gain leverage over developers); DOUGLAS R. PORTER, PATRICK L. PHILLIPS & TERRY J.
LASSAR, FLEXIBLE ZONING: HOW IT WORKS 77–78 (1988) (noting that flexibility allows for
extracting public benefits); Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 427–28 (arguing
local governments use discretionary approval processes that are waivers for unrealistically
strict zoning standards to get “maximum leverage in the subsequent bargaining” with
developers); FRED E. CASE & JEFFREY GALE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW AND
HOUSING: PROCESS LESSONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 90 (1982) (identifying
“extras” developers give up in LA to get discretionary approvals, such as setbacks, fence
construction, landscaping, installation of infrastructure, easement provision); C.J. Gabbe,
How Do Developers Respond to Land Use Regulations? An Analysis of New Housing in Los
Angeles, 28 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 3, 423 (2017) (“[W]hereas decision-makers employ
discretion at different points in the process, proven pathways to approval are highly valued
by developers, who are often willing to provide public benefits in exchange for allowances
and/or increased certainty with development approvals.”); Arthur T. Denzau & Barry R.
Weingast, Foreword, The Political Economy of Land Use Regulation, 23 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 385, 402–404 (1982) (arguing that the discretionary decisions in land-use law
create ample opportunity for political leaders to extract resources from landowners and
developers that are hard for reviewing courts or outsiders to detect).
35
See infra Section II.B.
36
See Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules—The Functions of Zoning, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 709, 723–25 (1986) (finding that neighborhood opposition and significance
of change in neighborhood character are major determinants of outcomes in discretionary
zoning decisions).
37
See KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK & MAXWELL PALMER,
NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS
25, 42–43, 79 (2020) [hereinafter EINSTEIN ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS]; id at 80
(“[R]egulations derive their power in part by offering unrepresentative members of the public
an opportunity to delay or stop the construction of new housing.”). Participants in land-use
hearings are often wealthier and whiter than the broader community, and disproportionately
opposed to new housing projects. Id. at 101–06 (summarizing results from study of
participants in land-use hearings in cities in metropolitan Boston).
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B. The Co-Evolution of Land-Use Law and Local Government
As the above summary indicates, zoning has grown more complicated over
time, with increasing layers of review imposed by local governments. The original
concept, as developed in the 1920s, was a base zoning system supplemented by
variances and conditional use permits. Design or architectural review was long
considered with deep suspicion by state courts and only became widely available in
the United States starting in the 1960s and 1970s. State-level environmental review
statutes are also primarily a product of the 1960s and 1970s.38
Throughout this history, one key principle has remained consistent for the vast
majority of local land-use systems: zoning has traditionally prioritized the protection
of single-family homes above all other uses.39 The key Supreme Court decision
upholding the constitutionality of zoning emphasized the importance of protecting
single-family homes from the intrusion of multifamily housing and commercial and
industrial uses;40 and the most widespread zoning category in many American cities
allows—and has allowed for decades—the development of only single-family
houses.
Because land use is regulated at the local government level, the structure and
formation of local governments have affected the implementation of land-use
regulation in the United States. There has been a long history of creating small,
suburban local governments in the United States, though, before the twentieth
century, many of these would ultimately get absorbed into an expanding central city.
After 1900, a variety of institutional and technological innovations began to
facilitate the creation of small, suburban cities that could maintain their
independence vis-à-vis large central cities.41 The result was fragmentation of local
governance in many major metropolitan areas around the United States.
38

FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENV’T L QUALITY, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971) (identifying a trend in the 1960s of the rise of
state involvement in land-use decisions).
39
See, e.g., BABCOCK, supra note 34, at 6 (stating that the “central goal” of zoning is
“insulation of the single-family district”); Steele, supra note 36, at 717 (arguing that in a
municipality “[s]ingle-family land use is the norm—the touchstone against which other uses
are implicitly measured”).
40
See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also Briffault, Our
Localism Part II, supra note 14, at 370 (noting judicial deference to local ordinances that
“lumped together apartments and other multifamily dwellings with industrial or commercial
uses and excluded them from the locality as threats to the local residential character.”).
41
Changes in state law facilitated easier incorporation of cities and made involuntary
annexation of smaller cities by larger ones harder. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 140–48 (1985); PAUL KANTOR,
THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND
SOCIAL POLICY 163–65 (1995) (stating that after state law allowed easy incorporation in
twentieth century suburbs “almost universally sought municipal incorporation in order to
control the development of their communities”). In addition, the rise of “contract cities,” in
which new cities could contract with counties to provide services that had large economies

2022]

SMALL SUBURBS, LARGE LOTS

15

A prime driver for the creation of many of these small suburban cities was a
desire to take control over land-use regulation by preventing annexation into a larger
central city.42 These small suburban cities in turn were often zoned for low
residential densities, with some zoning the entirety of their city for single-family
housing.43
Several factors operating together drove both the move towards single-family
zoning and fragmented local government. First, there is ample evidence that race
and class have been two of the primary drivers for the rise of fragmented local
governments with land-use regulatory control—and the use of that regulatory
control to facilitate “white flight” after World War II.44 Land-use regulation here
of scale, and special districts, in which cities could band together to provide capital-intensive
services such as water and sewer services, facilitated the creation and maintenance of small,
fragmented local governments. See GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS
OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 21 (1981); JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850–1970, at 173, 185 (1979);
NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PRIVATE VALUES IN
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 9–10, 19, 25–27 (1994); Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note
14, at 376–79 (describing three ways in which “[n]ew state laws reduced [the] fiscal
disincentivize to suburban incorporation”).
42
See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 19–21
(1994); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1847–49
(2003) [hereinafter Schragger, Consuming Government] (“The suburbanite often perceives
her borders as an entitlement, and her right to defend them through zoning as the core of selfrule.”); MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 28 (1976); JON C. TEAFORD,
POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE EDGE CITIES 16–18 (1997) [hereinafter
TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA] (noting examples from Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and New
York in the 1920s and 1930s); id. at 188–204 (examples in 1980s from St. Louis County and
Orange County, California); id. at 65–67, 99–100 (giving examples of “defensive”
incorporation in Michigan and Missouri in the 1950s to allow suburban neighborhoods to
control land use); FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 3 (“The history
of local government formation demonstrates that zoning is an essential ingredient of
municipal formation and function.”); Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 14, at 367
(“Suburban ‘[r]esidents perceived incorporation as a means of neighborhood protection[]’
and many incorporated in order to zone.”) (citation omitted).
43
See MILLER, supra note 41, at 86–97, 118–20; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1990) [hereinafter
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I] (“By 1970, more than 99% of the vacant and developable
land in northeastern New Jersey was zoned to exclude multifamily housing.”); see also
Stephen Menendian, Samir Gambhir & Arthur Gailes, Racial Segregation in the San
Francisco Bay Area, Part 5, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY OTHERING & BELONGING INST. (Aug.
11, 2020), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/racial-segregation-san-francisco-bay-area-part-5
[https://perma.cc/7CHX-T8TR] (finding that of all land zoned for residential uses in the Bay
Area, 82% is zoned for single-family housing).
44
See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 42, at 20 (“Thus many middle-income and upperincome households establish independent jurisdictions to pass local zoning, building code,
subdivision, and other regulations that raise the cost of housing high enough to exclude low-
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built on the history of redlining, urban renewal, racial covenants, and discriminatory
housing finance to create and maintain racially and class segregated housing.45
Although single-family base zoning has received most of the attention in
income people.”); DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER
AND PUBLIC POLICY 309 (2d ed. 1998) (noting example of St. Louis suburb seceding to block
integrated public housing); FRUG, supra note 17, at 134 (arguing that local government
powers and formation facilitate segregation); BURNS, supra note 41, at 20–21, 41–42, 54–
57, 83–90 (finding that desire to advance racial exclusion drove city formation in the 1950s);
Barbara Sherman Rolleston, Determinants of Restrictive Suburban Zoning: An Empirical
Analysis, 21 J. URB. ECON. 1 (1987) (finding that increased proportion of minorities in
neighboring jurisdictions correlates with more restrictive zoning); JACKSON, supra note 41
(arguing suburban zoning “provided a way for suburban areas to become secure enclaves for
the well-to-do”); Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J.
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 2, 125 (2000) (“Zoning . . . was invented in part to keep minorities away
from non-Hispanic Whites. . . . [L]arge-lot zoning and other land use controls with the
potential to exclude racial minorities remained available to municipalities throughout the
United States, often as a very thin cover for racial bias.”) (citations omitted); Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 8, 1860–78 (1994) (describing how the creation and boundary setting of suburban
cities in the United States facilitated and entrenched racial segregation); MILLER, supra note
41, at 172–203 (arguing that easy incorporation facilitates class and race segregation); Juliet
Ann Musso, The Political Economy of City Formation in California: Limits to Tiebout
Sorting, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 1, 145 (2001) (finding that wealthier communities are more likely
to form cities); JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL POLITICS AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES 19, 127–29 (2017) (finding that cities that were earliest in
adopting zoning early in the 20th century were more likely to be racially segregated later in
the 20th century); Laure J. Bates & Rexford E. Santerre, The Determinants of Restrictive
Residential Zoning: Some Empirical Findings, 34 J. REG’L SCI. 2, 261 (1994) (finding that
zoning is more restrictive when a city is near a central city with high proportion of poor
residents). But see J.M. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass, The Theory and Estimation of
Endogenous Zoning, 24 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 601, 620 (1994) (finding no correlation
between racial makeup in nearby communities and zoning).
Studies have also found that more fragmented metropolitan areas have higher economic
and racial segregation, RUSK, supra note 14, at 41, 46, 83–92; Eric J. Branfman, Benjamin
I. Cohen & David M. Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the
Residential Patterns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973). Additionally, studies have found
high levels of racial and economic segregation in suburbs. J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN
SUBURBIA 5, 12–13, 99–103 (2001); TROUNSTINE, supra note 44, at 217–22.
45
See generally TROUNSTINE, supra note 44, at 131 (“Generally speaking, segregation
levels remain higher than they would have without urban renewal policies where slums were
cleared and public housing was built.”); RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING
THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 2
(2013) (exploring the “ways that racially restrictive covenants expressed social norms, and
the ways that those social norms have related to legal norms, together facilitating patterns of
residential racial segregation . . . .”). Formation of small suburban cities with exclusionary
zoning also allowed residents to exclude poor residents and residents of color even after
racial covenants were no longer legally enforceable and federal fair housing laws prohibited
explicit discrimination. TROUNSTINE, supra note 44, at 61–62.
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discriminatory housing policies, discretionary land-use decision-making can be even
more pernicious by creating space for racially discriminatory application of the law
in a way that is difficult to identify.46
Next, residents and local governments often seek to deter development that may
have negative fiscal impacts and to attract development that will enhance municipal
coffers.47 Local governments provide a range of important and expensive public
services in the United States, including education and policing. Many states
authorize local governments to fund these services via property and sales taxes,
which in turn are largely determined by land-use decisions within local boundaries.
Commercial properties such as shopping malls, for instance, can provide large
amounts of sales tax revenues. Commercial and industrial properties often have high
property tax valuations. And commercial and industrial properties do not use
expensive local public services such as schools. On the flip side, cheap housing does
not have a high property tax valuation but may bring large numbers of residents who
in turn demand schools, parks, and police.48 The result is a fiscal pressure on local
governments when they make land-use decisions—what is called the fiscalization of
land use.49 This is one of the key drivers for the centrality of discretionary review in
local land use, in that the ability for local decision-makers to say no to projects gives
them leverage to negotiate for payments by developers to offset the costs of
development projects.
Relatedly, residents may be concerned about congestion of local services—
traffic, schools, parks. For instance, in California, school financing is now highly
centralized with local school district revenues largely determined by the number of
student-days, such that there should not be a major pressure to minimize school
expenditures. Yet residents may still be concerned that, for instance, the physical
46
TROUNSTINE, supra note 44, at 122 (“[W]hite homeowners and land-oriented
businesses controlled city governments and planning commissions and opposed residential
integration along either race or class lines.”); James C. Clingermayer, Heresthetics and
Happenstance: Intentional and Unintentional Exclusionary Impacts of the Zoning Decisionmaking Process, 41 URB. STUD. 2, 377 (2004) (noting that there are a wide range of
pretextual reasons that can support the exclusionary impacts of zoning).
47
See TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 42, at 60; MILLER, supra note 41, at 37–
40, 62 (arguing that creation of small cities in Los Angeles was a reaction against perceived
redistribution of resources to poorer communities or to larger jurisdictions, facilitating low
tax rates); PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY 85–86 (2001)
(noting the importance of fiscal zoning); FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note
7, at 65–66 (noting the use of land-use regulation to ensure that development is a net benefit
fiscally for local government).
48
DOWNS, supra note 42, at 23.
49
For evidence of fiscal motivations in zoning, see, for example, Bates & Santerre,
supra note 44, at 260 (finding evidence of fiscal zoning in study of Connecticut cities);
Pogodzinski & Sass, supra note 44, at 626 (concluding “that zoning is consistent with fiscal,
externality and exclusionary motives.”). But see Bengte Evenson & William C. Wheaton,
Local Variation in Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS URB. AFFS. 221,
249 (2003) (finding no evidence of fiscal zoning in a study of zoning ordinances in
Massachusetts cities).
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infrastructure of schools may be overwhelmed by new residents, at least in the short
term before additional state funding can kick in. And parks and open space may be
space-constrained, particularly in built-up cities, such that additional funding would
not resolve the problem.
Together, these factors have led to suburban land-use regulation that doesn’t
just protect single-family zoning, but also makes it difficult to construct anything
but low-density, expensive single-family housing—what is often called
exclusionary zoning.50 One tool to accomplish this goal in many suburban
jurisdictions was the use of large-lot zoning, requiring a large minimum size for a
lot to allow construction of a residence—sometimes up to one or more acres.51
Although it is not the only zoning tool that can raise the cost of housing, large-lot
zoning generally does make single-family houses significantly more expensive by
requiring a house purchaser to also purchase a substantial amount of undevelopable
land with the house. It also restricts supply in high-demand, job-rich areas by
limiting the amount of housing a given amount of land can produce. These two
factors combine to raise housing costs, effectively exclude lower-income homebuyers or renters, and restrict the total size of the population that can live in the
jurisdiction, avoiding pressure on public services.52
50

See, e.g., JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 44, at 308; Briffault, Our Localism Part
I, supra note 43, at 21–22; Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rules, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 624–25
(2002) [hereinafter Fennell, Home Rules] (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)); William A. Fischel, The
Evolution of Zoning Since the 1980s: The Persistence of Localism, in PROPERTY IN LAND
AND OTHER RESOURCES 259, 264–65 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012)
[hereinafter Fischel, Evolution of Zoning] (noting that exclusionary zoning prevents the
construction of low-income housing because it would harm the tax base by not generating
enough property taxes to “cover the additional public service expenditures”); Ford, supra
note 44, at 1855–56 (“Localities with the power to regulate land uses might limit the
construction of multi-family housing and moderately priced detached units to certain areas
of town, or might even exclude such development altogether,” in part to protect the municipal
tax base, if not for explicitly racial reasons).
51
See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. Of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 719 (N.J.
1975); Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley,
Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin 21–23 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Utah Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3472145
[https://perma.cc/X5FF-7S27] [hereinafter Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing].
52
Pendall, supra note 44, at 135 (finding that low-density residential zoning and permit
caps reduces rental and multifamily housing and contributes to racial segregation, while other
growth control tools have no statistically significant impacts); Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas
S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44
URB. AFF. REV. 779, 801–02 (2009) (finding that low-density zoning is correlated with racial
segregation); Jonathan T. Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, Density Zoning and Class
Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 1123, 1140–41 (2010) (finding that
low-density zoning is correlated with class segregation); Michael C. Lens & Paavo
Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas More Segregated by
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The rise of exclusionary zoning prompted efforts by courts and state
governments in some states to constrain it. Most notable were a series of decisions
by the New Jersey Supreme Court that found a state constitutional obligation on the
part of local governments to provide for their fair share of affordable housing in a
metropolitan area.53 California took an administrative approach, enacting laws in the
1980s that require local governments to plan for a certain share of regional needs for
affordable housing.54

Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6, 12 (2016) (finding that residential density regulations
lead to segregation of affluent residents from the broader community).
53
See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d 713; S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp.
of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). The original Mount Laurel opinion has a
thorough discussion of the motivations and mechanisms of exclusionary zoning, focusing on
fiscal demands:
The record thoroughly substantiates the findings of the trial court that over
the years Mount Laurel [the defendant town] ‘has acted affirmatively to control
development and to attract a selective type of growth’ and that ‘through its zoning
ordinances has exhibited economic discrimination in that the poor have been
deprived of adequate housing and the opportunity to secure the construction of
subsidized housing, and has used federal, state, county and local finances and
resources solely for the betterment of middle and upper-income persons.’
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the reason for this course of conduct
has been to keep down local taxes on Property . . . and that the policy was carried
out without regard for non-fiscal considerations with respect to People, either
within or without its boundaries. . . .
This policy of land use regulation for a fiscal end derives from New Jersey’s
tax structure, which has imposed on local real estate most of the cost of municipal
and county government and of the primary and secondary education of the
municipality’s children. The latter expense is much the largest, so, basically, the
fewer the school children, the lower the tax rate. Sizable industrial and
commercial ratables are eagerly sought and homes and the lots on which they are
situate [sic] are required to be large enough, through minimum lot sizes and
minimum floor areas, to have substantial value in order to produce greater tax
revenues to meet school costs. Large families who cannot afford to buy large
houses and must live in cheaper rental accommodations are definitely not wanted,
so we find drastic bedroom restrictions for, or complete prohibition of, multifamily or other feasible housing for those of lesser income.
This pattern of land use regulation has been adopted for the same purpose
in developing municipality after developing municipality. Almost every one acts
solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect builds a wall around
itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to the tax base . . .
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 722–23 (citations omitted).
54
See PAUL G. LEWIS, CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING ELEMENT LAW: THE ISSUE OF LOCAL
NONCOMPLIANCE 11–34 (2003).
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Another response to exclusionary zoning has been numerous scholarly calls for
greater regional governance.55 To the extent that fiscal pressures are a key driver of
exclusionary zoning, the argument was that regional governance—including
redistribution of revenues across the metropolitan region—might ameliorate some
of the pressures on local governments to focus on land uses yielding high tax
valuations.56 Redistribution of revenue through regional governance also could
incentivize local governments to provide more housing for lower-income residents,
which can help support regional economic growth.57 However, few proposals for
regionalization actually were implemented in the United States in the latter half of
the twentieth century, and fewer of those addressed land-use regulation.58
Through the twentieth century, the dynamic of land-use law and local
government formation was associated with white flight—with higher socioeconomic
status groups moving to the urban fringe to new suburban and exurban
developments, combined with concentrated poverty in urban cores. However,
55

See, e.g., CALTHORPE & FULTON, supra note 47, at 61–62 (discussing the intricacies
of the proposed regional city); RUSK, supra note 14, at 3–4; ANDRES DUANY, ELIZABETH
PLATER-ZYBERK & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 139 (2000); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl,
Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 94–98
(1999); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 43 (1998).
56
See Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal
City, 145 U. PENN. L. REV. 607, 655–56 (1997) [hereinafter Poindexter, Collective
Individualism]. See generally Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for
Regional Redistribution of Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. UNIV. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 3 (1995) (arguing for the suburbs to pay for expenses related to poverty in the city).
57
Cashin, supra note 14, at 1985, 1991–96, 2004 (detailing the problems intrinsic to
local governance such as bias and a “systematic practice of exclusion” and arguing for more
centralized American governance).
58
Examples of consolidation in postwar American include Nashville, Jacksonville, and
Indianapolis. TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 42, at 109. There has been tremendous
resistance in suburban counties to consolidation measures to create regional governments
from the 1920s to the present. Id. at 34–36, 40–41 (resistance of Nassau County, New York,
to consolidation measures, and limited regionalization measure that does pass in 1936
preserves local land-use powers); id. at 114–16, 133–34, 194–95 (voter rejections of
consolidation proposals in St. Louis County in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s); id. at 168–70
(resistance to metropolitan consolidation proposals in Cleveland and Pittsburgh in 1920s and
1930s); id. at 176 (noting widespread defeat of consolidation proposals in 1950s except for
Miami). Many of the successful regionalization efforts excluded land-use regulation from
the scope of the regional government. See id. at 76 (noting consolidated St. Louis county
government in 1950s only took on land-use powers by contract with incorporated cities); id.
at 78 (expanded county power in Suffolk County, Long Island did not include zoning); id. at
81–82 (planning commission created for Oakland County, Michigan coordinates among
local governments, but has very limited land-use powers). Portland, Oregon is a rare example
of successful regionalization that involved land-use regulation. See Carl Abbott & Margery
Post Abbott, A History of Oregon Metro, METRO (May 1991), https://www.oregonmetro.gov
/sites/default/files/2014/05/18/abbott-a_history_of_metro_may_1991.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RZ8E-278M].
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around the turn of the twenty-first century, this dynamic began to switch, with the
“return to the city.”59 Higher-income residents began to compete for housing in core
urban areas, drawn by urban amenities and prioritizing relatively short commutes
over the comforts of suburban lifestyles. The return to the city has also been
associated with evidence that exclusionary zoning is occurring even within some
large cities, as gentrified, wealthier, whiter neighborhoods constrain development.
C. The Fight over Local Control of Land use
The housing crisis in major metropolitan areas has produced a variety of
proposals for stronger state intervention to relax local zoning regulations and
increase housing production.60 For instance, in California, the state legislature has
debated and (in some cases) enacted legislation that requires local governments to
streamline approval processes for certain kinds of affordable housing projects,61 to
approve “by right” accessory dwelling units,62 and to upzone areas accessible to
transit in order to facilitate denser housing.63 These proposed and enacted reforms
have in turn prompted a heated opposition in the name of “local control” over landuse, arguing that land-use is the kind of question best addressed by local
governments responsive to local conditions.64
59

Lena Edlund, Cecilia Machado & Maria Micaela Sviatschi, Gentrification and the
Rising Returns to Skill 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research., Working Paper No. 21729, 2019).
60
See, e.g., H.B. 2001, 80th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); S.B. 6536, 66th Leg.,
2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); H.B. 152, 2020 Sess. (Va. 2020); H.B. 1406, 2020 Sess. (Md.
2020). For scholars arguing for state intervention, compare Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of
States in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV. 293 (2017), and Daniel R.
Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 899, 966, 973 (1976), with FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at
205 (arguing that race-to-the-bottom arguments should not support preemption of local landuse regulation, because local governments usually have incentives to avoid spillovers and
maximize benefits of development for residents).
61
See S.B. 35, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §
65913.4).
62
A.B. 68, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (noting accessory dwelling units are
additional units developed on a property in addition to an existing primary dwelling unit.
Examples include conversions of garages into small apartments, “in law” units converted
from bedrooms within a main building, and the construction of small outbuildings in lots that
can serve as additional units).
63
Laura Bliss, The Last Days of SB50, California’s Doomed Upzoning Bill,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2020/01/californiasb50-vote-affordable-housing-zoning-law-transit/605767/ [https://perma.cc/RQ73-MEED].
64
See, e.g., Marisa Kendall, Inside Livable California’s Fight for Single-family
Neighborhoods, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2020, 6:00 AM) https://www.mercurynews.com/
2020/01/26/inside-livable-californias-fight-for-single-family-neighborhoods/ [https://perma
.cc/BSD3-QMBY]. See also DOUGHERTY, supra note 4, at 188–95); Infranca, supra note 14,
at 852–54; Our 2020 Principles for Housing Legislation, LIVABLE CAL.,
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At the federal level, the debate has centered around federal fair housing rules
promulgated by the Obama Administration that would condition some federal grants
to local governments on taking steps to assess and redress exclusionary zoning.65 In
2020, the Trump Administration moved to repeal most of the Obama
Administration’s rules, and in the course of doing so, stated they were protecting
America’s suburbs from radical leftists seeking to force dense development on
suburban communities.66 Commentators critical of the Obama-era rule and
supportive of the Trump Administration repeal repeated this rhetoric, accusing the

https://www.livablecalifornia.org/portfolio-items/livable-californias-2020-principles-forhousing-legislation/?portfolioCats=60 [https://perma.cc/XV72-H3ZC] (last visited July 11,
2021) (“State legislation that respects the self-determination of local governments to control
their destinies, allowing them to expand housing opportunities in ways unique to their
jurisdictions.”); In 2019 We Opposed SB 50, SB 330, SB 592, AB 68 & AB 1487, LIVABLE
CAL., https://www.livablecalifornia.org/portfolio-items/in-2019-we-opposed-sb-50-sb-330sb-592-ab-68-ab-1487/?portfolioCats=60 [https://perma.cc/87GJ-PKTC] (last visited July
26, 2021) (“We oppose the growing list of top-down Sacramento bills by Wiener and his
largely Bay Area-based followers in the state legislature, who seek to cripple local planning
and land-use authority and hand this power to private developers.”).
65
See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Assessment Tool: Announcement of Final
Approved Document, 80 Fed. Reg. 81840 (Dec. 31, 2015) (referring to rules as
“affirmatively furthering fair housing” or AFFH rules). See also Brian J. Connolly, Promise
Unfulfilled? Zoning, Disparate Impact, and Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 48 URB.
LAW. 4, 831 (2016) (“Thus, a clear implication of the AFFH Rule is that jurisdictions
predominated by single-family homes and lacking in housing diversity will be expected to
zone additional lands for multi-family uses and other forms of inclusionary housing.”).
66
See Donald J. Trump & Ben Carson, Opinion, We’ll Protect America’s Suburbs,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2020, 4:02 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/well-protect-americassuburbs-11597608133, [https://perma.cc/KXB8-UFNL] (“[W]e stopped the last
administration’s radical social-engineering project that would have transformed the suburbs
from the top down. We reversed an Obama-Biden regulation that would have empowered
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to abolish single-family zoning, compel
the construction of high-density ‘stack and pack’ apartment buildings in residential
neighborhoods, and forcibly transform neighborhoods across America so they look and feel
the way far-left ideologues and technocratic bureaucrats think they should.”); Preserving
Community and Neighborhood Choice, 85 Fed. Reg. 47899 (Aug. 7, 2020) (to be codified
at 24 CFR Parts 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903). See also Ben Carson, Opinion, Obama’s
Housing Rules Try to Accomplish What Busing Could Not, WASH. TIMES, (July 23, 2015)
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try
-to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/JCH3-FTYK] (“[T]he rule would fundamentally change
the nature of some communities from primarily single-family to largely apartment-based
areas by encouraging municipalities to strike down housing ordinances that have no overtly
(or even intended) discriminatory purpose—including race-neutral zoning restrictions on lot
sizes and limits on multi-unit dwellings, all in the name of promoting diversity.”).
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Obama Administration and supporters of regional governance of wanting to “abolish
the suburbs” and erase local jurisdictional lines.67
Arguments for local control have been based on a range of theories. Most
frequently made are claims that local decision-making is better a priori for a range
of policy issues than decision-making at higher levels of government. In the context
of local land-use regulation, these claims are often founded on a belief that local
communities should have a greater say in land-use decisions because they are more
likely to feel the negative impacts of those decisions,68 because they have a better
sense of local conditions,69 or because communities or neighborhoods that have
historically been disempowered should have more control over land use as a matter
of equity and historical justice.70
67

Stanley Kurtz, Biden and Dems Are Set to Abolish the Suburbs, NAT’L REV., (June
30, 2020, 9:42 AM) https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/biden-and-dems-are-set-toabolish-the-suburbs/ [https://perma.cc/M8R5-T9TJ] (arguing that implementation of
Obama-era AFFH will “abolish the suburbs” and lead to “de facto annexation” of suburbs
by cities and creation of regional governance); Stanley Kurtz, Attention America’s Suburbs:
You Have Just Been Annexed, NAT’L REV., (July 20, 2015, 2:01 PM)
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/attention-americas-suburbs-you-have-just-beenannexed-stanley-kurtz/ [https://perma.cc/9269-XWUT] (“Just by issuing AFFH, the Obama
administration has effectively annexed America’s suburbs to its cities. The old American
practice of local self-rule is gone. We’ve switched over to a federally controlled regionalist
system.”); Stanley Kurtz, Burn Down the Suburbs?, NAT’L REV. (August 1, 2012, 8:00 AM)
https://www.nationalreview.com/2012/08/burn-down-suburbs-stanley-kurtz/ [https://perma
.cc/LD7H-KW9W] (claiming that the ultimate goal of proponents of regional government is
to “quite literally to abolish the suburbs”); see also Robert P. Astorino, Washington’s ‘Fair
Housing’ Assault on Local Zoning, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:01 PM) https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424127887323623304579056721426092030 [https://perma.cc/JBA5E8C5] (“The agency wants the power to dismantle local zoning so communities have what
it considers the right mix of economic, racial and ethnic diversity.”).
68
See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
– Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENV’T L. J. 269, 272 (2005) (“[A]n open and participatory
decisionmaking process serves both as a check on privileged dealmaking and as a necessary
conduit for important information about the relevant subjective and often competing interests
of individuals affected by a particular land use decision.”).
69
See Our Town: Restoring Localism, CTR. OPPORTUNITY URBANISM, 19 (2016),
https://urbanreforminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Restoring-Localism_9-10-16.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MLP9-KU4S] (criticizing state and regional intervention in land-use
decision-making in California on the grounds that “[l]ocal governments have historically
played a critical role in seeing to it that communities are built in ways that reflect local
preferences”); cf. Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 894–99 (1983) (discussing the intricacies of local
government); Camacho, supra note 68.
70
Anti-gentrification advocates, particularly in southern California, were also key
opponents of SB 50 and similar legislation, and they relied on arguments about local control
being essential to redress historical racial discrimination and prevent further gentrification.
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Another set of arguments for local control are based on the benefits of
competition across jurisdictions to produce efficient decisions for land-use
regulation. Conservative critiques of the Obama fair housing regulations explicitly
drew on interjurisdictional competition and citations to Tiebout competition
literature to justify devolution of power to the local level and even splitting up
existing large urban jurisdictions like New York City.71 More broadly, legal and
other scholars who are skeptical of regional governance and/or supportive of
sprawling suburban development have also drawn on the concept of
interjurisdictional competition and Tieboutian literature to justify decentralized local
governance structures.72

See DOUGHERTY, supra note 4, at 188–195 (describing this opposition and its alliances with
suburban opponents of the legislation).
71
See STANLEY KURTZ, SPREADING THE WEALTH: HOW OBAMA IS ROBBING THE
SUBURBS TO PAY FOR THE CITIES 126 (2012); id. at 7, 40, 119, 128 (criticizing Obama
Administration policies as infringing on local zoning powers, and characterizing them as part
of a plan to undermine suburbs). For additional conservative commentators making these
points based on Tieboutian theory, see Stephen Hayward, Legends of the Sprawl, HOOVER
INST. POL’Y REV. (Sept. 1, 1998), https://www.hoover.org/research/legends-sprawl
[https://perma.cc/SF7V-A59V] (relying on Tieboutian theory to argue against regional
governance, as part of a broader critique of anti-sprawl proposals such as smart growth
zoning); Howard Husock, Let’s Break Up the Big Cities, CITY J. (1998) https://www.cityjournal.org/html/let%E2%80%99s-break-big-cities-11899.html [https://perma.cc/UUN46D5V] (relying on Tiebout theory to argue against regional governance and in favor of
devolving powers to neighborhoods, including zoning).
Criticism of regional governance in the context of land-use regulation does not come
from just the right. In California, some of the opposition to regionalization has been from the
left, on the grounds that regional governance subverts local preferences and participation to
advance the interests of real estate developers. See Zelda Bronstein, The False Promise of
Regional Governance, 48HILLS (May 12, 2015), https://48hills.org/2015/05/the-falsepromise-of-regional-governance/ [https://perma.cc/2XV3-AS8S]; Zelda Bronstein, The
Attack on Local Zoning Control, 48HILLS (Dec. 8, 2015), https://48hills.org/2015/12/9080/
[https://perma.cc/XNZ8-DPMM].
72
See Howard Husock &Wendell Cox, The Enduring Virtues of American Government
Localism, in AM. ENTER. INST., LOCALISM IN AMERICA: WHY WE SHOULD TACKLE OUR BIG
CHALLENGES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 14, 18–20 (Joel Kotkin & Ryan Streeter eds., 2018)
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Cox.Husock.2.pdf?x91208 [https://perma
.cc/ZUM8-K3AG] (arguing against regional or state control of land-use regulation, relying
in part on Tiebout competition); Howard Husock, Suburban Government and the Virtues of
Local Control, in INFINITE SUBURBIA 660, 664–66 (Alan Berger, Joel Kotkin & Celina
Balderas Guzmán eds., 2017) (citing Tiebout as part of an argument in favor of local control
over land-use regulation). For scholars specifically criticizing regional governance on
Tieboutian grounds, see, for example, Robert L. Bish, Local Government Amalgamations:
Discredited Nineteenth-Century Ideals Alive in the Twenty-First, 150 C.D. HOWE INST.
COMMENTARY 1, 20 (2001) (citing Tiebout competition as argument for devolution of power
to local government and arguing that fragmented governance can support rapid economic
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Whatever their theoretical basis, these arguments for local control have
potentially large and real legal consequences for land-use regulation. Arguments for
“local control” have been the basis for constitutional challenges to state
interventions in California. California has a state constitutional “home rule”
provision providing for enhanced autonomy for certain kinds of cities (“charter
cities”).73 Opponents of state intervention have argued that this provision precludes
extensive state intervention in land-use control.74 There have also been proposals for
a state constitutional amendment committing land-use decisions to local, rather than
state, control.75 And “local control” is also part of the resistance to federal efforts to
encourage denser and more inclusive zoning by local governments, as seen in the
debates over the Obama Administration’s fair housing regulations.76
II. REGIONAL-LEVEL SPILLOVERS OF LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT
A key weakness of any devolution of governmental power to smaller-scale
jurisdictions is the possibility that the impacts of that small-scale jurisdiction’s
decisions might spillover beyond its borders, such that a jurisdiction will not have
an incentive to consider all of the impacts of its decision.77 Positive spillovers will

development); Salim Furth, Expanding Housing Opportunity in an Environment of
Exclusionary Regulation, GEO. MASON UNIV. (April 2, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/sys
tem/files/furth_-_testimony_-_housing_affordability_testimony_for_house_committee_on_
financial_services_-_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/54FX-FX6N] (testifying before the House
Committee on Financial Services and citing Tieboutian theory as a driver of efficiency in
government and identifying the “rise of regional governments” as a cause of higher housing
costs). See infra Section V.A for a discussion on how Tiebout competition might produce
efficient interjurisdictional competition for land-use regulation.
73
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
74
Bryan Wenter, Judicial NIMBYism? Overreaching San Mateo Trial Court Decision
Takes on Legislature and Governor, Declaring Nearly 40-Year Old Housing Production Law
Inapplicable to Charter Cities, MILLER STAR REGALIA: LAND USE DEVS. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.landusedevelopments.com/2019/11/judicial-nimbyism-overreaching-san-mat
eo-trial-court-decision-takes-on-legislature-and-governor-declaring-nearly-40-year-oldhousing-production-law-inapplicable-to-charter-cities/ [https://perma.cc/38WV-W8RH];
Alexei Koseff, California Tries to Save Law It Calls Crucial Tool in Housing Crisis, S.F.
CHRON. (Jan. 14, 2020, 5:36 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Californiaintervenes-to-try-to-force-San-Mateo-14972675.php [https://perma.cc/X83X-XTRV].
75
Sen. Wiener’s SB 50 Prompts Filing of Constitutional Amendment, PLAN. REP. (May
20, 2019), https://www.planningreport.com/2019/05/20/sen-wieners-sb-50-prompts-filingconstitutional-amendment%0A [https://perma.cc/MEH5-RZX2]; see also Kendall, supra
note 64.
76
See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
77
See, e.g., Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7, at 20–21 (noting that
spillovers undermine the argument for local control and governance); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222–23 (1992).

26

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

lead a jurisdiction to undertake less of the action that causes the spillover than would
be socially optimal; negative spillovers will cause the opposite result.
For our purposes, we will focus on two major categories of spillovers from local
land-use decisions: regional and national/global. In this Part, we will discuss
regional spillovers—specifically, the impact of local land-use decisions on regional
housing and job markets. In the next Part, we will discuss larger scale spillovers—
national, even global—where local land-use decisions affect national economic
growth, the ability of society to address climate change, and the ability of society to
provide for upward mobility more broadly.
A. The Theoretical Problem for Local Control in Land-Use Regulation
Regional spillovers center on how land-use decisions regarding housing could
have an impact on regional housing markets.78 Those impacts on regional housing
markets might also have regional economic impacts.79 Those regional housing and
economic impacts will go far beyond the borders of the jurisdiction that makes the
land-use decision.80 That jurisdiction will therefore have less of a reason to consider
those benefits.81
It is true that small jurisdictions may not individually matter much for regional
housing markets. But in a metropolitan area with highly fragmented local
governments, if there are a lot of small jurisdictions, their decisions in the aggregate

78

Pillsung Byun & Adrian X. Esparza, A Revisionist Model of Suburbanization and
Sprawl: The Role of Political Fragmentation, Growth Control, and Spillovers, 24 J. PLAN.
EDUC. & RSCH. 252 (2005) (theorizing that there are substantial spillover effects creating
“imperfect competition” that prevents the achievement of efficient outcomes); see also
William H. Hoyt, Imperfect Competition Between Communities, Politics, and Capitalization,
in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY 127, 129–30 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). However,
this research has not drawn on the housing crisis as evidence of the extreme nature of those
spillovers and has at times argued that spillovers might lead to higher levels of regulation or
taxation by larger cities. See id. at 131–32.
79
See generally FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 86–87, 257–
58 (2001) (“Scarcity of rental housing seems to have less worthy spillover effects. . . .
[N]ational and regional unemployment issues may warrant a more active rental market than
any individual community might want.”); Hills & Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning
Budget,” supra note 7, at 90–94; Briffault, Boundary Problem, supra note 7, at 1133–41;
Stephen Malpezzi, Housing Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas, 7 J. HOUS. RSCH. 2 (1996); Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts:
Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535,
544 (1992); Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7.
80
EINSTEIN ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS, supra note 37, at 169 (“[H]ousing
shortages are usually regional problems.”).
81
See DOWNS, supra note 42, at 27; FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra
note 7, at 167–68, 170–71; Schragger, Consuming Government, supra note 42, at 1831 (“[I]t
is probable that the full costs and benefits of the local [land-use] decision are not borne solely
by the residents of the jurisdiction.”).
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may have a major impact. Thus, if small jurisdictions have little interest in advancing
housing development, collectively, those individual decisions will matter.
The benefits of permissive local land-use decisions are therefore likely to spill
over beyond a city’s borders in the form of cheaper housing,82 but the harms may
remain localized. Many of the relevant adverse impacts of development are plausibly
small scale: increased traffic; the noise and disruption of construction; loss of light
and air for neighboring properties; increased demand for local services like schools
and police, and so forth. If the costs are smaller in geographic scale than the benefits,
then smaller jurisdictions will feel less of the benefits and more of the costs.
Those costs will fall in significant part on homeowners in the jurisdiction to the
extent that they affect home values. Homeowners have high stakes in home values—
for many Americans, the most important source of wealth is home value.83
Homeowners are often among the most politically active at the local government
level.84
Homeowners might respond to threats to property values and protect against
these threats through political participation, especially in responding to potential
development.85 In what he has called the “homevoter hypothesis,” economist Bill
82

To be precise, we expect employers, renters, and future residents in the metropolitan
area would benefit from cheaper housing. In contrast, cheaper housing might harm
incumbent homeowners across the metropolitan area. However, even incumbent
homeowners might gain from the other metropolitan-level benefits of cheaper housing, such
as increased regional economic growth and other products of agglomeration economics.
83
Wealth, Asset Ownership, & Debt of Households Detailed Tables: 2016, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/wealth/
wealth-asset-ownership.html [https://perma.cc/43CP-AYU8] (indicating the median value
of assets for U.S. households with various demographic characteristics and by type of asset
owned). FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 1 (“[H]ome values are the
largest part of most people’s assets, and public events like taxes and spending affect the value
of that asset.”).
84
Andrew B. Hall & Jesse Yoder, Does Homeownership Influence Political Behavior?
Evidence from Administrative Data, J. POL. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors)
(finding that homeowners vote more); Joseph T. Ornstein, Election Timing and the Politics
of Urban Growth (Aug. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://joeornstein.github.io/
ElectionTiming.html [https://perma.cc/S7Z2-PW7H ] (finding that homeowners are
disproportionately more likely to vote in off-cycle local elections); see also J. Eric Oliver &
Shang E. Ha, Vote Choice in Suburban Elections, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3 (2007) (finding
that homeowners are more knowledgeable and active voters). But see BRIAN J. MCCABE, NO
PLACE LIKE HOME: WEALTH, COMMUNITY, AND THE POLITICS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 80–90
(2016) (analyzing whether homeowners have higher political and civic participation rates
than renters, finding that while homeowners do have higher rates than non-homeowners for
many such forms of participation, even higher are those who are resident in a place for more
than five years, whether owning or renting).
85
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 8–10 (stating that risk
aversion by homeowners as to impacts on property values drives much opposition to housing
development); see also Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 151 (2010); Albert Saiz, The Geographic Determinants of Housing
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Fischel has articulated the argument that homeowners who are concerned about
home values will prioritize the protection of those home values in their voting
decisions.86 According to this theory, homeowners are a powerful force for
responding to negative effects from development, particularly in small suburban
jurisdictions where they are often the dominant actors in local politics and will
oppose much development.87 There is some evidence in support of the claim that
homeowners are the primary political driver of resistance to development,88 though
Supply, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1253, 1254 (2010); C.J. Gabbe, Why Are Regulations Changed? A
Parcel Analysis of Upzoning in Los Angeles, 38 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH. 3 (2018) (discussing
a study, based on collection of zoning changes in Los Angeles, finding that neighbors,
especially homeowners, are the primary determinants of whether property is up zoned).
86
For a summary of Fischel’s argument, see FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS,
supra note 7, at 4 (“The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowners, who are the most
numerous and politically influential group within most localities, are guided by their concern
for the value of their homes to make political decisions that are more efficient than those that
would be made at a higher level of government. Homeowners are acutely aware that local
amenities, public services, and taxes affect (‘are capitalized in’) the value of the largest single
asset they own. As a result, they pay much closer attention to such policies at the local level
than they would at the state or national level.”).
87
Id. at 229 (stating that homevoters seek low-density housing, which contributes to
sprawl and reduces affordability); id. at 87–88 (arguing that homeowners dominate small
cities); see also Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 405–06 (“Predevelopment
interests are far out-numbered and can hope to achieve political influence only if the home
owner majority is splintered on land-use issues.”); Kenneth A. Stahl, Reliance in Land Use
Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 949, 998 (2014); MCCABE, supra note 84, at 98–101.
88
For studies that support the role that homeowners play in obstructing development,
see Ornstein, supra note 84 (finding that homeowners are disproportionately more likely to
vote in off-cycle local elections, that ballot measures permitting more housing are more
likely to fail in off-cycle elections, and that cities with off-cycle elections approve fewer
building permits); François Ortalo-Magné & Andrea Prat, On the Political Economy of
Urban Growth: Homeownership Versus Affordability, 6 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECON. 154
(2014) (developing model that predicts homeowners will vote against growth); Jeffrey A.
Dubin, D. Roderick Kiewiet & Charles Noussair, Voting on Growth Control Measures:
Preferences and Strategies, 4 ECON. & POL. 191 (1992) (discussing study of zoning voting
in San Diego, finding that homeowners support growth controls); Alan Gin & Jonathan
Sandy, Evaluating the Demand for Residential Growth Controls, 3 J. HOUS. ECON. 109
(1994) (explaining that study of voting results for growth control initiative in San Diego
County finds that increased homeownership correlated with increased support for growth
controls); Mark Purcell, The Decline of the Political Consensus for Urban Growth: Evidence
from Los Angeles, 22 J. URB. AFFS. 85 (2000) (noting homeowners pose a major resistance
to growth in Los Angeles); Christopher Hawkins, Competing Interests and the Political
Market for Smart Growth Policy, 51 URB. STUD. 2503 (2014) (concluding that owneroccupied housing is inversely correlated with mixed-use and by right multifamily zoning,
based on survey of planning officials in Massachusetts and a state smart growth scorecard);
see also Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply, in 5B
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 1289, 1293 (Giles Duranton, J. Vernon
Henderson & William Strange eds., 2015) (noting the “role of homeowners as the primary
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the most recent survey of the relevant empirical literature found “little empirical
evidence that areas with more homeowners adopt stricter housing supply
regulations,” but also noted that the existing empirical literature has significant
weaknesses.89 Because our argument is more general—smaller jurisdictions have
less incentive to support development—it does not depend on a relationship between
homeownership and resistance to development, though the mechanisms would be
similar. For instance, renters in a smaller city may also object to the localized
negative impacts of development and undervalue the larger regional benefits of
housing production.90
These dynamics might be even more significant to the extent that
agglomeration of economic activity has major benefits, such that adding housing in
key metropolitan areas is crucial to addressing costs.91 If a particular metropolitan
area is increasingly important for economic activity because of agglomeration
effects, then that will drive economic growth in that metro area, and concomitantly,
housing demand. Production of housing in that metropolitan area will therefore have
disproportionately significant national effects.92 For instance, San Francisco has
become a hub for the tech industry, and that industry would benefit from increased
availability of housing within a reasonable commuting distance of San Francisco—
but the benefits of that housing will redound both for the entire region and the entire
supporters” of growth regulations); Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 405–06
(arguing that majoritarian politics in suburban cities allows homeowners to dominate
political system and impose growth controls to maximize property values). For contrary
assessments and studies, see Katharina Schone, Wilfried Koch & Catherine Baumont,
Modeling Local Growth Control Decisions in a Multi-City Case: Do Spatial Interactions
and Lobbying Efforts Matter?, 154 PUB. CHOICE 95, 115 (2013) (drawing on analysis of
French land-use tax data, finding that “[r]esident homeowners . . . do not seem to be the
driving force for the adoption of growth controls” and that instead absentee homeowners
acting as landlords are more important); Mark Baldassare & Georjeanna Wilson, Changing
Sources of Suburban Support for Local Growth Controls, 33 URB. STUD. 459 (1996) (finding
no connection between homeownership and support for growth controls).
89
Gyourko & Molloy, supra note 88, at 1308.
90
See Michael Hankinson, When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent,
Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473, 477–78 (2018) (examining a
recent study that found renters can be as oppositional to development as homeowners; in a
survey of voters in San Francisco, renters were found to be more likely than homeowners to
oppose development in their neighborhood, but more likely to support development in the
city as a whole).
91
Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration
Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 983 (2009)
(explaining that agglomeration effects are economic effects that increase with increasing
geographic density of population or activity and such effects are generally the result of
reduced transportation costs); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,
99 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1991) (examining the relationship between economic growth and
geographic density).
92
Schleicher, The City as a Subject, supra note 15, at 1534 (arguing that
“agglomeration gains . . . are not felt exclusively, or even primarily, within local government
boundaries”).
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nation.93 At the regional level, individual jurisdictions may seek to freeride off of
the agglomeration benefits in core economic areas, enjoying the higher housing costs
(which benefit incumbent homeowners) but not providing the housing that would
help the regional or national economy.94
While small jurisdictions would have less incentive to produce housing,95 larger
jurisdictions would have more—particularly to the extent that they are a locus for
economic activity that would benefit from housing production—at least up until a
certain size. When cities become large enough, such that they incorporate much or
all of the relevant metropolitan area, these cities may have the strongest incentives
to produce housing, all other factors being equal.96 On the other hand, cities that
incorporate all, or substantially all, of a metropolitan area may have a monopoly on
the production of housing in the metropolitan area. That monopoly position may
allow these cities to exploit their position controlling the metropolitan housing
market to produce less housing and raise the costs of housing.97
B. The Evidence of Regional Spillovers
There is both direct evidence of spillovers and evidence that smaller
jurisdictions produce less housing and that even large jurisdictions that make landuse decisions at a smaller geographic scale produce less housing.

93

See DOUGHERTY, supra note 4, at xii (noting the importance of agglomeration effects
as driving rising demand for housing in the Bay Area). We explore the details and
implications of this dynamic at the national level in more detail below, but it also has regional
implications.
94
Fennell & Roin, supra note 85, at 171 (“Exclusionary zoning presents one example
of an oft-noted problem created by territorial boundaries within metropolitan areas: the
ability of some jurisdictions to reap the general agglomeration benefits of the metropolitan
area without fully sharing in the costs of that agglomeration, and indeed, by failing to share,
increasing overall costs.”).
95
By small jurisdictions, we mean jurisdictions that are small relative to their broader
metropolitan area.
96
DOWNS, supra note 42, at 40–41 (“A central city can influence the total growth of its
metropolitan area under some circumstances[,]” as when it is “a large proportion of the entire
area’s population . . . [and] territory.”).
97
See infra Section III.B for an elaboration of this possibility.
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1. Direct Evidence
By now, substantial literature has developed exploring the extent to which landuse regulation in one jurisdiction impacts other jurisdictions, and it generally has
found spillover effects. One form of spillover effects is that housing costs might
increase in neighboring jurisdictions or at the regional level as a result of stricter
regulation in one jurisdiction.98 There is fairly consistent evidence from the
economics and planning literature that these effects exist.99 Of course, the impacts
98
Robert W. Helsey & William C. Strange, Strategic Growth Controls, 25 REG’L SCI.
& URB. ECON. 435 (1995) (creating an economic model that shows that growth control in
one community will create negative externalities in other communities without growth
controls); Jan K. Brueckner, Strategic Control of Growth in a System of Cities, 57 J. PUB.
ECON. 393 (1995) (developing a model predicting that growth controls will have spillover
effects on other cities, which may in turn respond with their own growth controls); see also
Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 402–03 (“Antigrowth policies that raise
housing prices within municipal boundaries make housing in competing jurisdictions
relatively more attractive to consumers. As a result, the demand for new housing in
competing areas is enhanced, raising the price of both new and used housing there.”); David
J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 401 (2001) (noting
spillover impacts of exclusionary zoning); Fennell, Home Rules, supra note 50, at 637–45
(same); Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1687 (2013)
(“The more local governments within a region adopt exclusionary measures, the more
pressure it puts on the remaining local governments to do the same.”); Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 164, 176 (2001) [hereinafter
Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise] (noting that local growth control may shift
development to other jurisdictions in the metro area).
99
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y., DO GROWTH CONTROLS
MATTER?: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION 36–37 (1990) (summarizing relevant
literature and finding that growth controls in one community raise housing prices in a
metropolitan area); William A. Fischel, Exclusionary Zoning and Growth Controls: A
Comment on the APA’s Endorsement of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 40 J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 65 (1991) (arguing that zoning laws can have the effect of spreading out expensive
metropolitan areas in a specific region); Maryjane Lenon, Sajal K. Chattopadhyay, & Dennis
R. Heffley, Zoning and Fiscal Interdependencies, 12 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 221 (1996)
(studying spillover effects from zoning rules in an analysis of Connecticut zoning and
housing data); John M. Quigley, Regulation and Property Values in the United States: The
High Cost of Monopoly, in LAND POLICIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES 46 (Gregory K. Ingram &
Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2007) (summarizing literature surrounding regional impacts of local
land-use regulation); Henry O. Pollakowski & Susan M. Wachter, The Effects of Land-Use
Constraints on Housing Prices, 66 LAND ECON. 315 (1990) (studying zoning in Maryland
and finding significant interjurisdictional spillover effects of land-use regulation); Man Cho
& Peter Linneman, Interjurisdictional Spillover Effects of Land Use Regulations, 4 J. HOUS.
RSCH. 131 (1993) (examining the nature of interjurisdictional spillover effect and estimation
bias). But see Bernard Fingleton, Housing Supply, Housing Demand, and Affordability, 45
URB. STUD. 1545 (2008) (noting that in the UK, the decrease in price caused by increased
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of any one individual jurisdiction on a metropolitan area will often be relatively
small, but in the aggregate, they might well be significant.
A related form of spillover effect is that neighboring jurisdictions might
respond strategically to decisions by an individual jurisdiction to change its land-use
regulations. For instance, if one jurisdiction enacts growth controls that drive growth
outside its borders, other jurisdictions may then enact growth controls to deal with
the spillover effects.100 Again, there is both theoretical and empirical support for the
proposition in both the planning and economics literature.101
2. Evidence from Studies of Sprawl
Another substantial branch of planning and economics literature has examined
the extent to which fragmented local government contributes to sprawl. Fragmented
local government might contribute to sprawl because of spillover effects. Stricter
regulation in one local government of land use could push development to other
jurisdictions with weaker regulation, causing leap-frog development.102 Again, there
is significant evidence in the economics and planning literature that fragmentation

housing production in particular locations can be offset by the increase in demand for
housing caused by the movement of jobs that are triggered by increased housing production,
if jobs follow housing).
100
Briffault, Boundary Problem, supra note 7, at 1134 (“When one locality acts to
exclude a use, its neighbors may feel compelled to adopt comparable regulations to protect
themselves from the growth they fear will be diverted to them by the initial locality’s
regulation.”); Schone et al., supra note 88, at 97 (“[A] city’s decision to set up growth
controls generally creates spillover effects and increases demand for land and housing in
other cities.”).
101
Q Shen, Spatial Impacts of Locally Enacted Growth Controls: The San Francisco
Bay Region in the 1980s, 23 ENV’T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 61 (1996) (using modeling
to examine the relationship between different localities around the San Francisco Bay Area
as regards their enactment of growth control policies and regional spatial growth impacts);
Kristoffer Jackson, Do Land Use Regulations Stifle Residential Development? Evidence
from California Cities, 91 J. URB. ECON. 45 (2016) (analyzing regulatory data to find that
that cities which have land use regulations see more changes in housing stock, residential
permits, and home construction).
102
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 248, 260–61, 263–64 (1985) [hereinafter
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS] (noting the possibility that restrictive suburban
zoning might increase housing costs overall in metropolitan areas and push development to
rural areas, encouraging sprawl); Briffault, Boundary Problem, supra note 7, at 1133–41
(describing spillover effects of land-use decisions, including encouragement of sprawl and
leapfrog development); Rusty Russell, Equity in Eden: Can Environmental Protection and
Affordable Housing Comfortably Cohabit in Suburbia?, 30 ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 437, 444
(2003) (arguing that sprawl results because of impact of development spills across
jurisdictional borders).
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of local government correlates with increasing sprawl, supporting the existence of
significant spillover effects from local housing decisions.103
3. Smaller Jurisdictions Have Stricter Zoning
A corollary of the spillover theory should be that, all other things being equal,
smaller jurisdictions should have stricter zoning than larger jurisdictions, since they
face fewer of the benefits of zoning that permits dense housing projects. The earlier
economics and planning literature found mixed results on this question.104
Bob Ellickson recently conducted ground-breaking, in-depth research into the
zoning codes of forty-one jurisdictions in three metropolitan areas: Silicon Valley;
Austin, Texas; and New Haven, Connecticut.105 Ellickson analyzed how each of the
jurisdiction’s zoning codes set minimum lot sizes for housing construction (i.e., how
prevalent large minimum lot sizes are in each jurisdiction); how much of the
jurisdiction’s land allows detached houses on small lots; and how much of the
jurisdiction’s land that is vacant and available for development allows multifamily
construction by right (without discretionary review). Each of these measures are
relatively good proxies for exclusionary zoning: large minimum lot sizes set a
minimum cost for entry into a jurisdiction’s housing market by requiring a larger
103

See generally John I. Carruthers, Growth at the Fringe: The Influence of Political
Fragmentation in United States Metropolitan Areas, 82 PAPERS REG’L SCI. 475, 495 (2003)
(finding that fragmentation is associated with sprawl); Adrian X. Esparza & John I.
Carruthers, Land Use Planning and Exurbanization in the Rural Mountain West: Evidence
from Arizona, 20 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH. 23, 23 (2000) (developing the theoretical argument
“that land use planners, and the planning discipline in general, hasten the pace of exurban
development”); Byun & Esparza, supra note 78; Jae Hong Kim, Timothy D. Keane & Eric
A. Bernard, Fragmented Local Governance and Water Resource Management Outcomes,
150 J. ENV’T MGMT. 378, 384 (2015) (finding that more fragmented local government is
correlated with lower increases in density).
104
For studies finding that larger cities have stricter zoning, see Edward L. Glaeser &
Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence from
Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265, 278 (2009) (finding that larger town size correlates
with higher minimum lot size); John F. McDonald & Daniel P. McMillen, Determinants of
Suburban Development Controls: A Fischel Expedition, 41 URB. STUD. 341, 358 (2004)
(finding in a study of zoning provisions in Chicago suburbs that “larger suburbs tend to make
greater use of nearly all forms of development controls and more complex zoning
ordinances”). For studies finding no clear evidence of a pattern, see Bengte Evenson &
William C. Wheaton, Why Local Governments Impose Land-Use Restrictions 18–19 (Aug.
2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding no evidence for or against
theory that smaller jurisdictions are more likely to produce stricter regulation); C.J. Gabbe,
Local Regulatory Responses During a Regional Housing Shortage: An Analysis of Rezonings
in Silicon Valley, 80 LAND USE POL’Y 79, 79 (2019) (finding, in a study across three cities
in Silicon Valley, that the largest city had both more upzoning that increased density and
more downzoning that decreased density).
105
See generally Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing, supra note 51 (developing
metrics for measuring exclusionary zoning and applying these metrics to Silicon Valley,
Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin).
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purchase of land to go with a house; allowing a significant amount of houses on
small lots is the reverse, because it allows purchase of a house with a relatively small
amount of land; and multifamily housing, by using land very efficiently to produce
housing, is the least exclusionary.
Ellickson found that the most exclusionary zoning by far was in New Haven.
And New Haven (as with most of the Northeast) has a much more fragmented local
government landscape than much of the rest of the country, with much smaller-sized
local governments.106 Ellickson’s results are consistent with data from research
surveys of planning departments around the country, which find that the Northeast
has some of the strictest zoning in the United States,107 including some of the most
exclusionary forms of zoning.108
4. Smaller Jurisdictions Produce Less Housing
Perhaps most important is the ultimate result of the land-use regulation process,
for example, whether smaller jurisdictions approve and build more or less housing
than larger jurisdictions. Here we draw on recent research that finds, in general,
cities and counties with larger populations produce more housing than smaller
jurisdictions. In particular, urbanized census tracts in jurisdictions with larger
populations have greater production of multifamily housing than census tracts in
jurisdictions with smaller populations.109 Tracts in jurisdictions under 50,000 in
population have the lowest rates of multifamily housing production, while
jurisdictions between 500,000 and one million in size have the highest.110
Jurisdictions over one million still produce substantially more housing than those
106

See Marantz & Lewis, supra note 6, at 5–7.
See, e.g., Joseph Gyourko, Albert Saiz & Anita Summers, A New Measure of the
Local Regulatory Environment for Housing Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use
Regulatory Index, 45 URB. STUD. 693, 714 (2008); Joseph Gyourko, Jonathan S. Hartley &
Jacob Krimmel, The Local Residential Land Use Regulatory Environment Across U.S.
Housing Markets: Evidence from a New Wharton Index, 124 J. URB. ECONS. 1, 2 (2021).
108
See Rolf Pendall, Robert Puentes & Jonathan Martin, From Traditional to Reformed:
A Review of the Land Use Regulations in the Nation’s 50 Largest Metropolitan Areas,
BROOKINGS INST. 12–14 (Aug. 2006) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016
/06/20060802_Pendall.pdf [https://perma.cc/V696-2AT9].
109
See Marantz & Lewis, supra note 6, at 11–26. The national study drew on census
tracts as the base unit of analysis rather than jurisdictions themselves. Id. That is because
larger population jurisdictions are likely, all other things being equal, to have more housing
construction, obscuring any relationship between population size and the openness of a
jurisdiction to increased housing production. Id. Census tracts, on the other hand, are much
more uniform in population than local governments. Id. Multifamily housing is important
because, as noted above, it is most likely to produce socioeconomic diversity in a community
and allow for affordable housing in areas with high land costs, such as high-demand metro
areas. Exclusionary zoning also generally targets multifamily housing.
110
Id. at 25. The study found that census tracts in cities with populations from 500,000
to one million produced 46 more multifamily units compared to census tracts in cities with
populations under 50,000. Id.
107
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under 50,000, though not as much as jurisdictions in the 500,000 to one million
category.111 This slight decline may reflect the ability of these very large
jurisdictions (of which there are very few) to dominate the land-use market,
consistent with a theory of monopolization by large jurisdictions.112
5. Within Larger Jurisdictions, Devolving Power to Smaller Geographic Scales
Produces Less Housing
Even within a larger jurisdiction, the structure of that jurisdiction’s political
process may have important implications for how housing is produced and provide
important insights on the extent to which housing development decisions have
benefits at greater geographical scales. As noted above, local legislatures play a key
role in housing decisions.113 It is city councils, for instance, that decide on rezoning
decisions. Even more important in practice, local legislatures often decide appeals
from lower-level decision-makers (such as staff and planning commissions) on
conditional use permits, variances, and similar decisions.114 The election and
structure of local legislatures have important implications for housing decisions
which can, in turn, provide insight into the spillover benefits of local housing
decisions.
A fundamental distinction for local legislatures is between those that are elected
from geographically-based districts within the jurisdiction (district elections) and
those that are elected by the entire population of the jurisdiction (at-large elections).
To the extent that legislators are responsive to their constituents, a district-based
system will lead individual legislators to privilege the interests of a smaller
population and geography over citywide interests. If negative effects of development
are smaller in scale and positive effects are larger in scale, that district-based
representation could, on average, produce less housing than at-large representation.
It turns out that this dynamic is quite strong in practice. Recent studies have
found that when a city shifts from at-large elections to district-based elections, the
amount of housing approved by the local government declines substantially—over
40% for multifamily housing.115 These results are consistent with the prior literature
111

Id. The study found that census tracts in cities with populations over one million
produced 24 more multifamily units compared to census tracts in cities with populations
under 50,000. Id.
112
See id.
113
See supra Section II.A.
114
See Moira O’Neill, Guila Gualco-Nelson & Eric Biber, Developing Policy from the
Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to Inform California’s Housing Policy
Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T. L.J. 1, 71–72 (2019) (providing data on administrative appeals
in Bay Area cities).
115
See generally Evan Mast, Warding Off Development: Local Control, Housing
Supply, and NIMBYs 11–12 (Upjohn Inst. Emp. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20-330, 2020),
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1349&context=up_workingpapers
[https://perma.cc/WM2U-EG28] (comparing, in a national study, cities that moved to district
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that predicted such a relationship.116 This dynamic is driven by norms in districtbased city councils where other city legislators commonly defer to legislators who
represent the district where the housing decision is occurring (what is often called

elections with cities that did not, and finding a 24% decrease in housing production, with
47% decrease for multifamily units and 12% for single-family units in cities that shifted
election structures); Michael Hankinson & Asya Magazinnik, The Supply-Equity Trade-off:
The Effect of Spatial Representation on the Local Housing Supply 21 (Feb. 20, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), (comparing housing production in
California cities that moved to district elections with cities that stayed at large, and finding a
decline of 56% in multifamily housing in cities that shifted election structures but also
finding that production was more equitably distributed across neighborhoods).
116
See FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 94 (“Ward-based cities
behave more like suburbs in land-use decisions.”); James C. Clingermayer, Distributive
Politics, Ward Representation, and the Spread of Zoning, 77 PUB. CHOICE 725, 730, 733
(1993) [hereinafter Clingermayer, Distributive Politics] (finding a historical pattern of
zoning being adopted more readily by cities with district-based representation); James C.
Clingermayer, Electoral Representation, Zoning Politics, and the Exclusion of Group
Homes, 47 POL. RSCH. Q. 969, 973 (1994) [hereinafter Clingermayer, Electoral
Representation] (finding a correlation between ward representation systems and zoning laws
excluding group homes based on a survey of local government officials); Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as Preemptive Intergovernmental
Compacts, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 135 (2019) (stating that district or ward representational
systems can mean more restrictive zoning); Hills & Schleicher, Affordable City, supra note
25, at 113 (arguing that in small suburbs or ward districts in large cities, “[a]t the size of a
single city electoral district, property holders and the city council members who represent
them have both incentives and capacity to limit development locally even where they support
growth overall”); AMY BRIDGES, MORNING GLORIES: MUNICIPAL REFORM IN THE
SOUTHWEST 203 (1997); Hills & Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” supra note 7,
(arguing that city council members focus on district-level concerns, which means they are
less likely to support upzoning); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. Y 1670,
1699–1717 (2013) [hereinafter Schleicher, City Unplanning] (arguing that ward voting
combined with case-by-case consideration of projects decreases development in major
cities); Hankinson, supra note 90, at 475 n.7 (“[N]eighborhood-level, ward-based decisionmaking leads to more restrictive zoning and fewer group homes in a municipality.”) (citing
Clingermayer, Distributive Politics, supra; Clingermayer, Electoral Representation, supra);
WEAVER & BABCOCK, supra note 30, at 194–96 (arguing that increased neighborhood power
can be in tension with allowing development that benefits the city as a whole). Scholars have
noted similar patterns when cities devolve significant housing decision-making power to
neighborhood groups. See William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The
New Belt and Suspenders of Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339, 340 (2013) (arguing
that neighborhood conservation districts are an additional local veto point on land-use); Greg
Morrow, The Homeowner Revolution: Democracy, Land Use and the Los Angeles SlowGrowth Movement, 1965–92 (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA) (ProQuest) (finding that
neighborhood-led bottom-up planning promotes slow growth in Los Angeles).
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“aldermanic courtesy”)117—this exacerbates the local control over housing decisions
and the emphasis on the negative local effects of that decision.118
C. Variation in Land-Use Regulation Across Small Jurisdictions
In addition to spillover effects, another important driver of lower housing
production in smaller jurisdictions is the variation in zoning rules across local
governments. We found significant variations in zoning rules, standards, and even
basic concepts across local jurisdictions in California.119
These variations are not just nomenclature. Cities often used the same names
for very different processes. For example, Planned Unit Developments (PUDs) are
a zoning tool that many jurisdictions use to facilitate relatively large planned
developments that might include a combination of residential, commercial, office
uses, and reserved open space, which generally involve the creation of a new zoning
district for that specific development.120 However, other cities use PUDs as a tool to
allow a specific project (usually an individual building) to be built under a
preexisting zoning and planning system, without any need for rezoning.121 Even
where land-use regulatory tools in theory accomplish the same goal, they may come
with dramatically different procedures in different cities. For instance, design review
117

The term “aldermanic courtesy” originates in Chicago, where the practice is
entrenched. See WEAVER & BABCOCK, supra note 30, at 147 (describing aldermanic courtesy
in Chicago). For broader discussion and other examples, see BABCOCK, supra note 34, at
141; Purcell, supra note 88, at 95 (discussing the example of Los Angeles: “For land use
decisions in a given district, the other 14 members generally defer to the will of that district’s
council member.”).
118
The flip side is that district-based legislators are more responsive to local preferences
as to housing, which is supported by advocates for local control. See Ostrom et al.,
Government in Metropolitan Areas, supra note 17, at 838 (1961) (arguing for more
devolution of decision making to neighborhoods in large cities, and stating that the “interests
of smaller publics might be properly negotiated within the confines of a smaller political
community”); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82
MINN. L. REV. 503, 515 (1997) (arguing that increased sublocal governance can allow more
voice and tailored conditions for neighborhoods). There is also evidence that shifting to
district-based representation means that the siting of housing is more evenly distributed
across the city, rather than being concentrated in politically less powerful neighborhoods
(often poor and minority neighborhoods). See Hankinson & Magazinnik, supra note 115, at
2–6. Those potentially more equitable outcomes lead some scholars to advocate for districtbased election even given the potential impact on housing production. Kenneth A. Stahl, The
Artifice of Local Growth Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial
Review, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 63–69 (2010).
119
Moira O’Neill-Hutson, Eric Biber, Raine Robichaud, Giulia Gualco-Nelson & Nick
Marantz, Examining Entitlement in California to Inform Policy and Process: Advancing
Social Equity in Housing Development Patterns 19–23 (Mar. 18, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
120
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER
SERKIN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 358–61 (4th ed. 2013).
121
O’Neill-Hutson et al., supra note 119, at 52.
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in some cities is done by planning staff administratively, and in other cities requires
public hearings before multiple commissions.122
These variations in local land-use regulatory processes may create barriers to
entry to developers seeking to work in new jurisdictions. They create substantial
learning costs for a developer seeking to understand what the approval process is
and how it works.123
These barriers to entry may be particularly important in restricting development
in small jurisdictions, where the costs of learning a new land-use regulatory system
can only be spread across a limited number of projects. It is one thing for a developer
to learn a new regulatory system for a city like Los Angeles—while the system there
is byzantine in its complexity,124 learning that system also opens the door for
development in a city of four million. In contrast, in the Silicon Valley area of
California, which has a similar-sized population, a developer has to learn the
planning and zoning rules for at least eighteen small- to medium-sized cities in
addition to the rules for two counties that have unincorporated areas within the

122

Id.
For a description of learning costs, and their importance in creating administrative
burdens for entities seeking to comply with government rules, see PAMELA HERD & DONALD
P. MOYNIHAN, Understanding Administrative Burden, in ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN:
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 15–41 (2018).
124
A PDF printout of the L.A. city zoning code runs over 600 pages. See L.A., CAL.,
MUN. CODE §§ 11.00–19.19 (2021).
123
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Valley.125 These costs may be a significant deterrent for developers126 and exclude
national developers who might bring competition to new markets.127
III. NATIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPACTS OF LOCAL LAND-USE DECISIONS
A. National Economic Impacts
One national impact of local land-use decisions is simply a larger-scale version
of the impact of those decisions on regional job markets and economies. To the
extent that agglomeration economics are increasingly important in modern, postindustrial, global economies, society will be worse off if local land-use decisions
125

The core of Silicon Valley includes the following cities in Santa Clara and San
Mateo Counties: Campbell, Cupertino, Los Altos, Los Altos Hills, Los Gatos, Milpitas,
Monte Sereno, Morgan Hil, Mountain View, Palo Alto, San Jose, Santa Clara, Saratoga,
Sunnyvale, East Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton, Redwood City. See Silicon Valley Map,
https://www.siliconvalleymap.org/ [https://perma.cc/92HH-H985] (last visited July 26,
2021).
126
C. Tsuriel Somerville, The Industrial Organization of Housing Supply: Market
Activity, Land Supply, and the Size of Homebuilder Firms, 27 REAL EST. ECON. 669, 679
n.13 (1999) (arguing that there are economies of scale for builders in dealing with regulation,
which would create a barrier to entry into new jurisdictions); see also Byun & Esparza, supra
note 78 (arguing that strict land-use regulation creates barriers to entry for small developers).
Developers often focus on particular jurisdictions where they can rely on their knowledge of
the local zoning rules and connections with elected officials and neighborhood groups. CASE
& GALE, supra note 34, at 66 (“The experienced, well-connected developer has an advantage
over the out of town or new developer.”); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of
Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1297–98 (1997) (discussing “[l]ocal regulators’
incentive to discriminate against new developers” and in favor of developers established in
their localities); Corie Calfee, Paavo Monkkonen, John M. Quigley, Stephen Raphael, Larry
A. Rosenthal & Joseph Wright, Measuring Land-Use Regulation in the San Francisco Bay
Area: Report to the MacArthur Foundation12 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics) (“Builders who successfully
and profitably navigate the entitlement process in one locality may then benefit when
proposing future projects in that jurisdiction. Strict rules and requirements stand as a barrier
to entry, but those establishing the necessary knowledge base, and personal and political
relationships, may then realize advantages relative to others who wish to build.”).
127
Defense of the status quo by local builders reflects their vested interest in the
exercise of zoning authority by suburban governments. The fragmentation of public control
over land use and housing has played an important role in sustaining small developers in an
era of rapid increases in the scale of most enterprises. The local contractor’s comparative
advantage is his ability to develop intimate knowledge of local regulations and close relations
with local officials. Builders in the suburbs are understandably reluctant to see changes in
the present system that would jeopardize their privileged status or encourage competition
from outsiders who lack access to local officials and familiarity with local zoning, building,
and subdivision codes. DANIELSON, supra note 42, at 133–37 (noting that national builders
tend to push for preemption of local control, while regional or local builders often support
local zoning).
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constrain housing in the metropolitan areas that are the centers for agglomeration
economics. Higher housing costs in those metropolitan centers deter people from
living in those areas, artificially increasing labor costs and decreasing economic
activity. The mechanism is more or less the same as at the regional level—local
governments feel most or all of the pain from individual development projects, while
many of the benefits are felt at a much larger scale. Economists have estimated that
the impacts of restrictive local land-use regulation on national economies are
significant—one study found that stringent land-use regulation reduced U.S.
economic growth by 36% over a 55-year period.128 There may be a range of other
benefits that agglomeration economics can provide for national economies as well,
such as increased rates of technological innovation.129
B. Global Climate Impacts
Local land-use decisions have a global climate impact in the way they affect
greenhouse gas emissions. Transportation is one of the most important sectors of
emissions in the United States and is increasingly important as emissions from the
electricity sector decrease.130 The challenge is ironically best exemplified in
jurisdictions that have been the most aggressive in decarbonizing their economies.
For instance, in California, the state’s aggressive efforts to decarbonize its electricity
grid have reduced the share of state-wide emissions from electricity to about 14%.
However, transportation produces 40% of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions; and
while California and national electricity greenhouse gas emissions are declining,
transportation emissions are increasing nationally131 and have only just started to
decline in California.132
Transportation emissions can be reduced in a significant way by
electrification—the conversion of automobiles, buses, and trucks from internal
combustion engines to electric motors—presuming that the electricity grid has been
decarbonized. However, to achieve climate goals, it is also essential to reduce the

128

See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 15, at 1.
For an overview of those additional possible benefits, see David Schleicher, Stuck!
The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017).
130
Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.
gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/M
XA4-WWU2] (last visited July 25, 2021).
131
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/F5DP-FY4V] (last visited July 13,
2021).
132
Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting 2018 Emissions Year Frequently Asked
Questions, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/gh
g-rep/reported-data/2018mrrfaqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNT9-E46K]; see also California
Greenhouse Gas Emissions for 2000 to 2017: Trends of Emissions and Other Indicators,
CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD. 5–9 (2019) (identifying transportation and electric power sector
trends as well as overall state trends).
129
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amount of transportation by automobiles.133 That is primarily because cars have an
average lifespan of fifteen years in the United States.134 As a result, if we rely solely
on electrification to eliminate transportation emissions, the time it takes to turn over
the vehicle fleet means that significant emissions from legacy internal combustion
engines will occur for a decade or more, even with an extremely aggressive (and
perhaps unrealistic) transition to electric motors for new vehicles. Reducing the
amount that cars are used—vehicle miles traveled (VMT)—has the advantage of
reducing emissions from all vehicles and has a more immediate impact on
greenhouse gas emissions than electrification.
However, reducing VMT requires a move towards denser, less car-dependent
urban forms. It is impossible, or at least unrealistic, to expect people living in
sprawling suburbs to stop using their cars and instead bike, walk, or use public transit
for transportation.135 Indeed, development below a certain density is economically
infeasible to serve with public transit.136
Residents of dense cities thus have lower carbon footprints than residents of
otherwise similar suburban, rural, and exurban areas, and densification can help
significantly reduce carbon emissions overall.137 But the global climate benefits of
133

Alejandro E. Camacho, Melissa L. Kelly, Nicholas J. Marantz & Gabriel Weil,
Mitigating Climate Change Through Transportation and Land Use Policy, 49 ENV’T L. REP.
10473, 10473–74 (2019) (noting importance of reducing VMT to help CA achieve climate
goals).
134
Antonio Bento, Kevin Roth & Yiou Zuo, Vehicle Lifetime and Scrappage Behavior:
Trends in the U.S. Used Car Market, 39 ENERGY J. 159, 159 (2018).
135
See, e.g., Alieza Durana, Getting from Here to There: In the Suburbs, Car
Ownership Is Practically a Necessity, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/03/the-suburbs-were-built-for-cars-todays-suburbanincomes-were-not.html [https://perma.cc/XJ5C-5NSJ]; Robert Cervero, Making Transit
Work in Suburbs, 1451 TRANSP. RSCH. REC. 3, 3 (1994); John Pucher, Public Transportation,
in GEOGRAPHY OF URB. TRANSP. 202 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve Giuliano eds., 2004).
136
See S. Cooke & R. Behrens, Correlation or Cause?: The Limitations of Population
Density as an Indicator for Public Transport Viability in the Context of a Rapidly Growing
Developing City, 25 TRANSP. RSCH. PROCEDIA 3003, 3005 (2017) (describing the “density
threshold,” or the minimum population density level “needed by different modes of public
transport to be viable”).
137
See Christopher Jones & Daniel M. Kammen, Spatial Distribution of U.S.
Household Carbon Footprints Reveals Suburbanization Undermines Greenhouse Gas
Benefits of Urban Population Density, 48 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 895, 895 (2014) (finding
“consistently lower” household carbon footprints “in urban core cities . . . and higher carbon
footprints in outlying suburbs . . .”); Edward Glaeser, Cities, Productivity, and Quality of
Life, 333 SCI. 592, 594 (2011) (“Within the United States, low-density living is associated
with substantially higher carbon emissions from home energy use and transportation than is
living in dense urban centers.”). Notably, the climate benefits of housing abundance in
California would be particularly substantial. Four of the five U.S. metropolitan areas with
the lowest annual standardized household CO2 emissions are located in California. Edward
L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities: Carbon Dioxide Emissions and
Urban Development, 67 J. URB. ECON. 404, 410 (2010). As economists Edward Glaeser &
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dense infill development will spillover far beyond the borders of local governments,
meaning they will have less incentive to consider them. That does not mean, of
course, that cities will take no action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There are
many examples of cities that have produced climate action plans that provide
commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.138 These efforts have the
promise to make a real difference in helping to address climate change, given the
importance of cities for global economic and population growth.139 Many of these
cities are central cities, which for all the reasons developed above may have stronger
incentives to provide for dense, infill development that can reduce housing costs in
a metro area140—and therefore may have an incentive to reduce climate emissions
in this way in any case. Moreover, climate action plans often include a wide range
of actions, only some of which might involve local land-use decisions.141 The nonland-use decisions may be much easier politically or economically for the city to
pursue, and there is at least anecdotal evidence that cities, especially small cities,
with climate action plans have made little progress on the land-use component of
those plans.142

Joe Gyourko note, “[i]f California’s restrictions induce more building in Texas and Arizona,”
where household CO2 emissions are much higher, “then their net environmental effect could
be negative in aggregate.” Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications
of Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 27 (2018).
138
See, e.g., Office of Energy & Sustainable Devevlopment, Berkeley Climate Action
Plan, CITY OF BERKELEY, https://www.cityofberkeley.info/climate/ [https://perma.cc/PTT8DXZV] (last accessed July 13, 2020); Eric Garcetti, L.A.’s Green New Deal: Sustainable
City Plan, MAYOR L.A. (2019), http://plan.lamayor.org/sites/default/files/pLAn_2019_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9XV-4J8P]; City of San Diego Climate Action Plan, CITY SAN
DIEGO (Dec. 2018), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/final_july_2016_cap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JPV-ETUV].
139
Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and
Aggregate Growth, 30 KREISMAN WORKING PAPER SERIES HOUS. L. & POL’Y 1 (2015);
Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental Renaissance, 108 CAL.
L. REV. 305, 305 (2020).
140
See supra Section IV.A.
141
See the climate action plans cited supra note 138.
142
For instance, Santa Barbara, a coastal city with a strong stated commitment to
environmental protection, has struggled with the implementation of its climate action plan
components related to land use. See Scott Wilson, Fires, Floods, and Free Parking:
California’s Unending Fight Against Climate Change, WASH. POST: 2°C: BEYOND THE
LIMIT (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/climateenvironment/climate-change-california/ [https://perma.cc/6XAY-8LMS] (noting that 2015
emissions in Santa Barbara were 14% above 2007 levels). While there are current state-level
efforts in California to encourage local governments to plan for more transit-oriented
development, those efforts fall short of a mandate on those local governments and instead
primarily rely on various financial and non-financial incentives to encourage infill
development. Camacho et al., supra note 133, at 10481.
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C. Equity and Social Mobility Considerations
A final broader scale impact of local land-use decisions is the impact on nonresidents, particularly those for whom living in metropolitan areas with high levels
of economic opportunity could provide significant economic gains.143 The economic
success of metropolitan areas with high levels of agglomeration economics can
provide major economic opportunities for individuals living in other parts of the
United States, or even for residents of those same metropolitan areas who happen to
live in outlying areas. Research indicates, for instance, that land-use regulation may
increase national income inequality by excluding lower-wage and skilled workers
from jobs and housing in high-growth metros.144 However, the economic
opportunities for these non-residents will not be considered by local governments
since they are not current voters, only potential future voters.
More broadly, there is significant social science research that indicates children
from families in lower socioeconomic categories reap significant benefits from
living and growing up in wealthier neighborhoods. Some of these benefits include
improved outcomes in educational attainment, income, and health.145 Breaking
down exclusion from high opportunity neighborhoods would produce great benefits
for these children and their families. But many of these children and their families
live outside jurisdictions with high opportunity neighborhoods, so these jurisdictions
are less likely to consider the benefits of reducing exclusion in making land-use
decisions. Indeed, the history of race, class, and land-use developed earlier in this
Article makes clear that excluding these children and their families was a key goal
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Schleicher, supra note 129, at 96–107, 114–17.
See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the
U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76, 76 (2017) (“[R]ising housing prices in high-income
areas deter low-skill migration . . . .”); see also Richard Florida, How Expensive Cities Hurt
Workers: For Working Class and Service Employees, Wages Matter Less than What They
Can Afford to Buy, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2016, 9:09 AM), https://www.citylab.com/life/20
16/07/how-expensive-cities-hurt-workers/490688/
[https://perma.cc/2MNV-FDW3]
(describing the growing economic divide between lower income workers and the creative
class in expensive metro areas); Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks & Christopher Serkin,
Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70 DUKE L.J. 1763 (2021) (“[S]uperstar cities
are running up against extreme housing affordability problems, rendering middle-class life
all but unsustainable.”).
145
Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on
Intergenerational Mobility II: County-Level Estimates, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1163, 1163 (2018);
Patricia J. Martens, Daniel G. Chateau, Elaine M. J. Burland, Gregory S. Finlayson, Mark J.
Smith, Carole R. Taylor, Marni D. Brownell, Nathan C. Nickel, Alan Katz, James M. Bolton
& the PATHS Equity Team, The Effect of Neighborhood Socioeconomic Status on Education
and Health Outcomes for Children Living in Social Housing, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2103,
2103 (2014).
144
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for incorporating many of these jurisdictions and their development of land-use
regulations.146
There are both efficiency and equity implications to improving both economic
outcomes and broader quality-of-life outcomes for people from lower-income and
socioeconomic categories through changes to land-use regulation. From an
efficiency perspective, people are not as productive for society as they otherwise
could be if they could move to metropolitan areas with economies driven by
agglomeration effects. More directly, society is worse off when there are fewer
people available to help drive economic growth in these areas.147 Equally or more
important are the equity implications: People are foreclosed from the opportunity to
earn higher incomes, more social mobility, and greater life outcomes because local
governments exclude them from moving in.148
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In Parts II and III, we compiled the evidence that the positive spillovers from
housing development are significant and generally lead fragmented and small local
jurisdictions to underprovide housing. In Part IV, we focus on four significant
implications of our analysis. First, our analysis deeply undermines the normative
argument that competition among local jurisdictions can provide efficient outcomes
in local land-use regulation. Second, our analysis challenges scholars who have
called for providing local jurisdictions greater powers, at least in the context of landuse regulation. Third, our analysis provides a buttress in policy debates for much
more significant state intervention into local land-use decisions, although this does
not necessarily mean complete state preemption is warranted. Fourth, our analysis
supports a call for more standardized land-use regulation that facilitates transparency
and accountability.
A. The End of Tiebout?
The debates over exclusionary zoning that we summarized in Section I.B.
emphasized the negative impacts of local government control over land use.
146
See supra Section II.B. See also supra notes 44, 50 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of race and class in land-use regulation); see also TROUNSTINE, supra
note 44, at 123 (“[W]hite homeowners vigorously blocked the building of low-income and
multiunit housing in their neighborhoods.”).
147
See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 15, at 1.
148
DOUGHERTY, supra note 4, at xiii (“Rising housing costs are a main driver–arguably
the main driver–of segregation, income inequality, and racial and generational wealth
gaps.”); id. at xv (arguing that interregional mobility is a key way to address inequality).
Zoning will not address all elements of regional inequality, nor can it address inequality that
remains for individuals who are unable or unwilling to move to high-opportunity
metropolitan areas. See Sitaraman et al., supra note 144, at 1815–25. However, we believe
that on net, greater housing production in high-opportunity metropolitan areas will be an
important contributor to reducing inequality, even if it is not a complete solution.
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However, separate academic literature has emphasized the benefits of competition
among large numbers of local governments. The premise of this literature is that
competition among local governments would lead to more efficient government
administration, as local governments compete for residents. These arguments drew
on the work of Tiebout, who developed a model to demonstrate that sorting of
residents among local governments could allow those residents to select the mix of
public goods they desired, and thus provide a pricing and allocation mechanism for
public goods that otherwise cannot be traded in the market.149 Economic and legal
scholars took the original, descriptive Tieboutian model to make a normative
argument that competition between jurisdictions for development and (the right sort
of)150 residents could prompt the efficient production of public goods by those local
governments, as each government would choose to provide a mix of public goods
that would appeal to particular residents.151 Reciprocally, residents could move and
sort themselves into the jurisdictions that best matched their preferences.
Tiebout’s theory was originally applied by scholars to the concept of the
provision of public services, such as schools or police, with predictions that
metropolitan areas that had more competition among local governments would be
more efficient in the provision of public services, with better services and lower
taxes.152 Greater competition would generally imply a larger number of local
governments and thus a more fragmented local government structure.153
However, scholars soon extended the theory to land-use regulation.154 In that
context, the claim usually is that competition among local governments for residents
would drive local governments to provide efficient land-use regulation that met
149

Tiebout, Local Expenditures, supra note 10, at 419 (articulating the local
government model). For an excellent, concise summary of the original Tiebout paper, see
Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 803–
04 (2019).
150
We say “right sort” because jurisdictions might have an incentive to compete only
for wealthy residents who can pay for the public goods and services being provided by the
local government. We expand on this point infra, notes 161–167 and accompanying text.
151
See Fennell & McAdams, supra, note 149.
152
See, e.g., Poindexter, Collective Individualism, supra note 56, at 615 (arguing that
“[e]mpirical data . . . bear out the Tiebout hypothesis” by showing that middle-class
migration between cities is related to taxes and education spending); William H. Hoyt,
Leviathan, Local Government Expenditures, and Capitalization, 29 REG’L SCI. & URB.
ECON. 155, 158–59 (1999); Caroline M. Hoxby, The Productivity of Schools and Other Local
Public Goods Producers, 74 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1 (1999) (developing theoretical model that
Tiebout competition can produce higher efficiency and productivity); FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 223 (arguing that local government fragmentation
in Los Angeles County produced competition that made the central cities more efficient).
153
See Ostrom et al., Government in Metropolitan Areas, supra note 17, at 832.
154
See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local
Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 205–06 (1975); Serkin, Local Property Law, supra note
9, at 899–900; see also Infranca, supra note 14, at 833 (noting possibility that Tiebout
competition can produce “certain efficiency gains” by allowing residents to sort by their
“preferences for a particular package of taxation, regulation and amenities”).
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socially optimal needs for housing.155 Some residents might prefer bucolic rural
environments, leading some local governments to provide that environment through
suitable land-use regulation. Other residents might prefer denser environments with
mixed-uses, and again other local governments could provide that type of setting
through suitable regulation.156 Overall, the dynamic interaction among local
governments would match demand for housing with supply—those that
undersupplied would have too few residents, too high housing costs, and lose
residents to neighbors; those that oversupplied might have crowded public services
and lose residents to neighbors with better services. The balance between the two
would lead to an efficient allocation of land use across all the local governments in
the metropolitan area and prevent inefficient land-use regulation by local
governments.157
Accordingly, under this theory, the development of regional governance might
be positively harmful, as it would reduce interjurisdictional competition.158 It would
allow the single regional government that controlled land use to set prices, plausibly
too high, with underproduction of housing.159 This risk might be even greater with
155
See Been, supra note 9, at 506–08, 514–26 (explaining the political theory of
competitive federalism and the influence of competitive federalism); Robert Warren, A
Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organization, 30 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
193, 197–98 (1964).
156
Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, 506 (“The famous Tiebout Hypothesis
suggests that differentiation among suburbs enhances consumer satisfaction by making
available a wider variety of packages of public goods.”).
157
Id. at 430 (arguing that there is no “strong efficiency reason to place tethers on the
discretion of fungible suburbs” because competition will prevent regulation that stifles the
“natural rate of growth”); Steven J. Eagle, On Engineering Urban Densification, 4
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 73, 73 (2015); Garnett, Planning for Density, supra
note 9, at 11; Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership, supra note 9, at 1906, 1908, 1915
(discussing the market pressures potential home owners exert on “both local governments
and private developers to offer policies that satisfy their preferences”). See Serkin, Local
Property Law, supra note 9, at 901–03 for scholars explicitly arguing that Tiebout
competition can constrain local land-use regulation; Been, supra note 9.
158
ROBERT L. BISH, THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 161 (1971)
(claiming that centralized or consolidated metropolitan government is “a despotic solution”);
see also Warren, supra note 155; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1201, 1222 (1999). Nobel-prize winning scholar Elinor Ostrom supported this position.
See Elinor Ostrom, The Danger of Self-Evident Truths, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 33, 33–35
(2000).
159
Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. URB. ECON.
116, 116 (1978) (“If the zoning power within an urban area is sufficiently concentrated (that
is if there are a sufficiently small number of autonomous jurisdictions) the urban-area supply
of housing will be below, and its price above, those which would prevail in competitive
equilibrium with no zoning.”). Scholars pointed to Los Angeles as an example of a highly
fragmented metropolitan area where the fragmentation could facilitate interjurisdictional
competition. See BISH, supra note 158, at 91–92 (noting fragmented local government in Los
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the possibility that the single regional government might be captured by an interest
group that had a reason to constrain development and raise prices—for instance, a
monopoly developer or incumbent property owners.160
It is important to keep in mind that Tiebout competition focused on efficiency,
not equity.161 To the extent equity is considered in this literature, it notes that the
interjurisdictional competition would make redistribution from richer to poorer
residents very difficult for local governments (who would see their rich residents
move to another jurisdiction), such that redistribution would have to occur at a
higher level of government.162 The different foci of the Tiebout competition (on
efficiency) and exclusionary zoning (on equity) literatures meant that to some extent,
those working in these two spaces were contesting the relative importance of
efficiency versus equity.163
But in fact, the equity implications of Tiebout competition are even more stark.
Efficient allocation of public goods under Tiebout competition requires in part the
ability of local governments to exclude people from moving into the jurisdiction, to
avoid overcrowding of those public goods.164 For instance, a jurisdiction that
chooses high service and high tax levels has to be able to ensure that those who use
its public services and public goods pay those high tax levels. Given that American
local government has primarily been financed by property taxes, this would be
undermined if, for instance, large numbers of new residents are able to move into
Angeles produced “dynamism, competition, and change taking place within an
understandable system geared to efficient meeting of consumer demands”); Ellickson,
Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 425 (arguing that Los Angeles County in the 1970s was
an example of “[p]erfect [c]ompetition [a]mong [u]ncongested [s]uburbs”).
160
See Ellickson, Suburban Growth, supra note 12, at 409 (noting the risk that
regulation at “the metropolitan, regional, or state level – say a state environmental agency or
land-planning commission” might produce monopoly regulation). Some scholars have
argued that the credible threat of entry by new local governments (e.g., through easy
secession or incorporation) can provide the benefits of competition without a large number
of local governments. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 227–28;
Dolores Tremewan Martin & Richard E. Wagner, The Institutional Framework for
Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions
in California, 21 J.L. & ECON. 409, 416 (1978).
161
See Been, supra note 9, at 506–08, 514–26 (noting that Tiebout competition can
result in income segregation in highly fragmented metropolitan areas and regressive
outcomes in terms of tax and service levels).
162
Charles M. Tiebout, An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization, NAT’L
BUREAU ECON. RSCH. 79, 94 (1961) (stating that under competitive circumstances, “the rich
[will avoid] paying taxes for the poor”).
163
FRUG, supra note 17, at 168–72 (critiquing application of Tiebout theory to local
government law in part because it produces exclusionary zoning that leads to segregation
and inequality); MILLER, supra note 41, at 156–57, 167–72 (arguing that the efficiency gains
of Tiebout competition come at the expense of equity).
164
See Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian
Perspective, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY 163, 169 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction].
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the jurisdiction and pay low property taxes by purchasing cheap housing. These new
residents would then use the services, increasing demand, without contributing the
same level of revenue that prior residents provided.165 This problem is resolved with
the use of exclusionary zoning to exclude these potential residents.166 In other words,
the standard version of Tiebout competition necessarily presumed exclusion, and
such exclusion could be targeted at the poor.167
There are also scholars who have questioned whether Tiebout competition
would actually play out in practice. Tiebout’s model depends on a range of
assumptions that are highly unlikely to manifest in the real world.168 For instance, it
assumes fungibility across jurisdictions that may not be realistic as some
jurisdictions may have location-specific or other advantages vis-à-vis other
communities; it also assumes a readiness of individuals to move. Both of these
assumptions may be highly questionable both within metropolitan areas and across
metropolitan areas.169 Tiebout theory has also been criticized for ignoring issues of
race and class. Specifically, scholars have noted (as summarized above) the long
history of using local government and jurisdictional borders, as well as land-use

165
See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT
MODEL AT FIFTY 21, 27 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (noting “free-rider problem” under
Tiebout competition in “a world in which local government finance their budgets with
property taxes” where a “household . . . can purchase a house with a value substantially
below those of other residents in the community and thereby consume public goods at a tax
price below that of other households in the community”).
166
See id. at 27–28; Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction, supra note 164, at 163, 174–81;
William A. Fischel, Property Taxation and the Tiebout Model: Evidence for the Benefit View
from Zoning and Voting, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 171, 172 (1992); Richard C. Schragger, Cities,
Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1114–16
(2008) [hereinafter Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, Free Trade Constitution];
Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 116, at 1684–85 (explaining Robert Ellickson’s
critique of exclusionary zoning practices and his recognition of the “similar negative effects”
of inclusionary zoning); FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!, supra note 14, at 135, 160–61;
DOUGHERTY, supra note 4, at 108–09. The seminal paper is Hamilton, supra, note 154.
167
See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 497
(2017); Infranca, supra note 14, at 833.
168
Fennell & McAdams, supra, note 149, at 803; Been, supra note 9, at 550–51 (noting
limits to Tiebout competition, including that local governments may have site-specific
amenities, barriers to entry for developers, and limited land to develop); Briffault, Boundary
Problem, supra note 7, at 1144 (noting that competition among local governments for
residents only can work if you have “both a large number of small localities in close
proximity to each other and a general separation of work from residence, so that households
can move relatively easily from one locality to another without changing jobs.”); Hills &
Schleicher, Affordable City, supra note 25, at 115–16 (arguing that Tiebout competition will
not be effective where individual jurisdictions have amenities that are not available
elsewhere, including the benefits of agglomeration).
169
Indeed, arguably the real import of Tiebout’s original paper was in demonstrating
the implausibility of the initial assumptions, and thus the very importance of issues such as
spillover effects. See Fennell & McAdams, supra, note 149, at 804–05.

2022]

SMALL SUBURBS, LARGE LOTS

49

regulation, to exclude lower-income people and people of color.170 The use of
jurisdictional lines as tools of exclusion, as documented above, also challenges the
extent to which Tiebout theory can assume mobility by individuals in response to
different preferences over local government choices.
Our analyses in Parts II and III make clear that in the context of housing
production and land-use regulation, the key assumption of no spillover effects is
false. Local government decisions with respect to housing will generally have
significant spillover effects, and, as a result, local governments will not have strong
incentives to provide the optimal amount of housing. Moreover, the strength of the
evidence we have compiled in Parts II and III weighs heavily in favor of the
conclusion that the spillover effects of housing now dominate any plausible benefits
from interjurisdictional competition in land-use regulation, given the important
impacts of agglomeration economics on major metropolitan areas.171 At least in the
context of land-use regulation, that means Tiebout competition among local
governments cannot be an argument for efficient outcomes.172
That conclusion is all the more important given the real questions about the
impacts on equity of Tiebout competition. This is in part because the focus of
Tiebout competition analysis on efficiency downplayed the equity impacts of
competition among local governments, which might lead to highly unequal
outcomes in terms of a mix of services and resources across jurisdictions.173
Moreover, the competitive interactions among local governments make
redistribution within a jurisdiction to offset any intra-jurisdictional inequality more
difficult, as those who are the source of resources that are redistributed could move
to other jurisdictions without redistribution.174 Finally, the restrictions on entry in
many jurisdictions that land-use regulations impose mean that the sorting function
that Tiebout competition is supposed to facilitate operates with increasing difficulty,
undermining Tiebout competition theory both on equity grounds, because those
excluded will often be poor, and on efficiency grounds, since the efficiency benefits
from competitive sorting will be reduced.
At first glance, our conclusions here are limited to land-use regulation. There
may be a range of other circumstances in which local interjurisdictional competition
170
See, e.g., Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7, at 24–26; MILLER,
supra note 41, at 156–57, 167–72; FRUG, supra note 17, at 168–72.
171
We are agnostic about whether Tiebout competition was more efficient in the midtwentieth century when agglomeration economics were less powerful.
172
For statements along these lines from prior scholarship, see, for example, Briffault,
Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7, at 18 (noting the importance of spillovers in land
use and how they undermine the efficiency of Tiebout competition).
173
See Oates, supra note 165, at 21, 41 (noting that while Tiebout competition
“promotes efficient resource use” it has “some unappealing distributional consequences”).
174
See FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 129–61 (arguing that
redistribution of education funding among competitive local governments is ineffective). At
least, that is the theory’s prediction, though there is evidence that local governments
undertake significant amounts of redistribution. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development,
Free Trade Constitution, supra note 166, at 1147–48.
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is efficient. For instance, public service provision by local governments may be
efficient where there are few spillover effects, where there are not economies of
scale in provision of the service, and where responsiveness to local preferences as
to service provision might be normatively desirable (perhaps because it has minimal
equity implications).175
But even in the context of service provision, the fact that land-use regulation
by small jurisdictions creates significant inefficiencies raises challenges for Tiebout
theory. As noted above, to the extent that provision of public services and public
goods by local governments either turns on ensuring that residents pay a minimum
amount of taxes or where there is a risk of public goods becoming overcrowded,
exclusion is essential to the theory of how competition will lead to higher quality or
higher resourced public goods. And as noted above, where property taxes are the
primary method of funding local government, land-use regulation is the primary
(perhaps only, in a post-de jure segregated America) way to effectively exclude lowincome residents from moving into a jurisdiction.176 If primary local control over
land-use regulation can no longer be normatively justified on either equity or
efficiency grounds, that also raises real questions about the normative justification
for local control in other areas, at least where those justifications depend on Tiebout
competition.177
B. Local Government Reformists
While scholars who have drawn on Tiebout competition emphasize the ability
of local governments to make choices about public goods and taxes in ways that
allow for sorting by residents, another set of legal scholars have emphasized the
constraints that local governments operate under. These scholars have argued that
local governments in the United States are actually substantially limited in their legal
and practical ability to make significant policy choices in a wide range of areas.178
While the formal legal doctrine might indicate that local governments have
substantial leeway to operate, these scholars emphasize the ability of state courts and
legislatures to effectively shrink that leeway through narrow interpretations of state
constitutional provisions granting home rule to local governments and through state
175
See Keith Dowding, Peter John & Stephen Biggs, Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical
Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767, 787 (1994) (surveying empirical research on Tiebout finding
support for the claim that expenditures on public services are lower as the number of
jurisdictions increases).
176
See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text.
177
We emphasize that our conclusion is focused on the normative merits of Tiebout
competition—whether the efficiency produced by that competition in land-use regulation
outweighs efficiency and equity costs. We do not question in this piece the descriptive
validity of Tiebout analysis. Specifically, sorting of residents across local governments might
occur and might reflect differential preferences for public goods.
178
See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2257; see generally FRUG &
BARRON, supra note 19; see also SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 19, at 60–86
(describing limits to local government powers in the United States).
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legislation that preempts local powers.179 These scholars argue that many of the
dysfunctions of modern American urban governance stem from these constraints on
local government power—particularly inequality across cities and counties—and
that the appropriate remedy would be to expand local government authority.180
Recently, local government scholars have connected the historical political and
legal weakness of American local governments to a new trend of aggressive state
preemption of local regulatory powers. This “new preemption” involves a range of
characteristics: state legislation that preempts a wide swath of local regulatory
powers; state legislation that not only preempts local regulation, but results in a
regulatory vacuum without corresponding state regulation (“null preemption”);181
and preemption statutes that impose steep penalties on local governments and local
elected officials who contest state preemption rules.182 The preemption dynamics are
generally driven by conservative-dominated state legislatures seeking to constrain
policy innovation by progressive city governments, particularly in large
metropolitan areas.183 The ability of state legislatures to greatly diminish local
government autonomy in most states allows state legislatures, driven by political
polarization, to override local governments.184 Local government scholars have
decried the new preemption as stifling local democracy and preventing innovative
policy developments.185 In response, many local government scholars have called
for reinforcing local government autonomy under state law.186
While this scholarship often highlights the limits on local authority in areas
such as fiscal and education policy, it also identifies land-use regulation as an area

179
See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2263; FRUG & BARRON, supra
note 19, at 54–61; SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 19, at 69–70 (describing limits to
local government powers in the United States).
180
See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2364–79; FRUG & BARRON,
supra note 19, at 211–12 (discussing proposals in context of land-use regulation).
181
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1016–
51 (2010).
182
For literature describing the trend, identifying patterns, and providing examples, see
Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20; Davidson, supra note 20; Diller, supra note 20;
Scharff, supra note 20; Schragger, Attack, supra note 20.
183
See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 1999–2002; Davidson, supra note
20, at 957–58.
184
See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 2011–14; Schragger, Attack, supra
note 20, 1192–95.
185
See Scharff, supra note 20, at 1491–93; Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20,
at 2017–25.
186
See Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 2017–25; Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2364–79; FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 211–12
(discussing proposals in context of land-use regulation); see also NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES,
supra note 21, at 26 (presenting a group of leading local government scholars calling for a
“substantial state interest” that is “narrowly tailored” for any state preemption of local
power); id. at 26, 35, 53 (calling for presumption of local power).
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where these limits harm the production of affordable housing in the United States.187
Indeed, one prominent local government scholar, Richard Schragger, has argued
against reducing local government power over local land-use regulation. Schragger
contends that there is no assurance that state-level intervention in land-use regulation
will eliminate exclusionary and restrictive zoning patterns and that state preemption
of local land-use regulation runs the risk of opening political space for broader statelevel preemption of local authority consistent with the “new preemption.”188
Superficially, this analysis may seem widely divergent from our own, where
we contend that it is precisely the breadth of land-use powers held by local
governments that contributes to the underproduction of housing in the United
States.189 There are at least two possible reasons for this divergent reaction. First,
some of these scholars explicitly focus on central cities in their analysis, while our
focus is on the much larger number of small jurisdictions, which are a significant
portion (often even a majority) of the area and population of metropolitan areas.190
Second, the difference also reflects a focus on various components of affordable
housing policy in the United States. These local government reformist scholars point
to limits on the ability of local governments to adopt rent control or require deedrestricted units as part of residential developments (what is often called
“inclusionary zoning”)—in other words, assuming that housing units are available
or will be constructed and ensuring that a certain component of those units are
available for lower-income residents.191 Our focus instead is on production of all
units—affordable and market-rate—as a key component of addressing the housing
crisis. Rent control or inclusionary zoning requirements will not, of themselves,
facilitate the production of more units of housing.192 Indeed, there are arguments that
187

See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2346–57; FRUG & BARRON,
supra note 19, at 99–120.
188
See Schragger, Perils, supra note 22, at 21–31.
189
Richard Schragger discusses in some detail the ways in which local land-use
regulation can undermine regional housing production and create interjurisdictional barriers
to mobility within metropolitan areas. SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 19, at 53–54,
108–110, 118; id. at 109 (“[T]he cumulative impact of local zoning ordinances generates
significant distortions in the regional and national market for land.”).
190
Frug and Barron’s book for instance, only focuses on seven cities that are all “large,
successful central cities.” FRUG & BARRON, supra note 19, at 4; see also Schragger, Attack,
supra note 20 (focusing on impacts of state preemption on large urban cities).
191
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2347, 2349–61; FRUG & BARRON,
supra note 19, at 99–120. Frug and Barron also discuss the limits on local regulation of
development of state-owned land and possible limits on business improvement districts and
tax increment financing systems by local governments. Id; see also Schragger, Perils, supra
note 22.
192
Rent control or inclusionary zoning requirements may, however, be an important
component of a political bargain to advance more housing production through relaxing local
land-use regulatory barriers. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1183–84 (1981) [hereinafter Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary”
Zoning]. They may also be important elements of ensuring that increased housing production
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they may interfere with production of housing in certain circumstances, which is a
debate that we do not take up in this Article.193 We do not see limits on local landuse regulation as being a significant reason why local governments fail to approve
more housing, in general.194
There are key distinctions between our analysis, the policy proposals that we
develop below, and the “new preemption” discussed by local government scholars.
We do not advocate for complete deregulation of land use or “null preemption.”
Whether at the state or local level, we believe there is a role for government in
regulating conflicting uses of land. We also argue that not all state-level intervention
need be punitive, as in the “new preemption” model. Nor does state intervention
need to completely displace local regulation in land use, as we discuss in more detail
below.
But most importantly, our theory provides an argument for state intervention
that is specific to land use and therefore does not necessarily contribute to broader
preemption of local regulatory authority, as has occurred in the “new preemption”
and as feared by Schragger. Our analysis identifies a specific way in which local
regulation of land use produces spillover effects on regional and national housing
markets and economies and on climate change. Spillover effects are a rationale for
state intervention long recognized by legal scholars.195
Our analysis also responds to Schragger’s point that “there is no reason to
believe that a state’s land use regime . . . will not come to reflect similar political
pathologies” as local governments.196 Because states will incorporate more of the
positive effects of housing production at a regional or state-wide scale, states will
therefore, on average, have more of a reason to advance housing production than
local governments. Of course, this incentive for states to produce more housing will
not always prevail in the contingent battles over individual housing proposals, but
there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that these battles will be more
often won at the state rather than the local level. That, of course, does not mean that

will produce more equitable outcomes, as we discuss in more detail, infra notes 206–211 and
accompanying text.
193
See generally Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, supra note 192.
194
It is more plausible to us that state restrictions on local fiscal policy might drive
reluctance by local governments to approve housing, and that is an area where broader local
powers might be important to address housing shortages. See SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER,
supra note 19, at 72; Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2346–47.
195
See Schragger, Perils, supra note 22, at 27 (“Centralization of decisionmaking is
theoretically a solution to spillovers . . . .”); Briffault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at
2021. Nestor Davidson has argued that the requirement in most states that government action
advance the “general welfare” can justify preemption of local actions that have extraterritorial negative effects or are exclusionary. Davidson, supra note 20, at 990–92.
196
Schragger, Perils, supra note 22, at 3.
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reforms cannot proceed at the local level as well, as shown by recent changes to base
single-family zoning in cities like Minneapolis.197
Our analysis therefore provides an important caution or caveat to reformist
proposals that broad expansions of local government powers are beneficial. Indeed,
as we discuss next, we believe that in the land use regulatory context, there likely
should be significant contraction of local powers in at least some contexts or at least
significant state supervision.
C. The Need for State Intervention
If local governments that do not cover the entirety of a regional or metropolitan
economy have an incentive to underproduce housing, then that, in turn, implies a
need for intervention at a higher level of government—state government.198 State
government would be more likely to take into account the regional impacts of

197

Id. at 56–58 (expressing concern that local governments with less land-use control
will be unable to use discretionary land-use review processes to advance progressive goals
such as promoting unions or higher wages for workers on new projects; noting that CBAs,
which can be a tool for empowering neighborhoods that have historically been
disempowered, depend on discretionary review processes). CBAs, for example, are often
associated with either large commercial or mixed-use projects. See MALO ANDRÉ HUTSON,
THE URBAN STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: DEEPENING
THE ROOTS (2016) (discussing case studies of CBAs across multiple cities); Nicholas J.
Marantz, What Do Community Benefits Agreements Deliver?: Evidence from Los Angeles,
81 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 251, 252 (2015). To the extent the goal is to use case-by-case
discretionary review to advance progressive goals—as opposed to legislation requiring those
goals be advanced in all projects, which can be coupled with ministerial review—real
advancement of those progressive goals will likely be achieved with large projects. Notably,
however, our proposal does not necessarily call for eliminating all discretionary review. State
law can also attempt to advance progressive goals (like prevailing wages and affordable
housing) in exchange for streamlining or ministerial review. See S.B. 35, 2017–2018 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2017) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–
65589.11 (West 2021) (providing for streamlining and elimination of environmental review
of housing development that conforms to underlying base zoning, meets specific
affordability or mixed-income criteria, and is coupled with prevailing wage and other labor
requirements, in jurisdictions that fail to meet housing production obligations).
198
See Infranca, supra note 14, at 885–86 (making the case for state-level preemption
of some forms of local land-use regulation to ensure housing production); see also Lemar,
supra note 60. Recent scholarship has criticized preemption by states of local policymaking
in a range of fields such as environmental protection or education, arguing that these efforts
seek to impose “uniform statewide policies” without any justification of protecting
“metropolitan-area residents . . . from city spillovers.” Richard C. Schragger, Federalism,
Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1597 (2019) [hereinafter
Schragger, Federalism]. But, as we established in Parts III and IV, local land-use regulation
that affects housing production is precisely an example of a spillover from local decisionmaking on metropolitan areas that justifies higher-level governmental intervention.
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housing decisions, including the regional benefits of producing more housing.199 It
is true that local governments have strong political power at the state level,200 such
that they are likely to be powerful interest groups protecting their interests, including
against development that has local negative implications. Nonetheless, at the state
level, local governments will only be one interest group of many advocating for
positions with respect to housing, rather than being (as they are now) effectively a
decision-maker with veto power.
We also emphasize that state intervention need not take the form of full statelevel control or even regionalization of all local government decision-making with
respect to land-use regulation. Such an approach has had limited political success
historically in the United States and has limited political viability today.201 States
may not be the best venues for consideration of regional impacts, as states can be
both overinclusive (including large rural areas that are outside of metropolitan areas)
and underinclusive (where metropolitan areas cross state borders).202 In addition, the
local impacts of housing production are not impacts that should be dismissed out of
hand—they should be considered, just in the context of the regional benefits of that
housing.203 Thus, a targeted approach that is focused on land-use regulation’s
impacts on housing, and ensures an appropriate consideration of regional or broader-

199

We can think of limited exceptions, such as when states only include a part of a
metropolitan area, as in the New York and Washington D.C. metro areas. However, even in
those metropolitan areas, we think that the state will have stronger incentives to encourage
housing production on average by including a much larger share of that area than any local
government.
200
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 36 (“It can formally be
said that local governments are creatures of the state, but as a political matter, states are more
often creatures of the local governments.”); Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise, supra
note 98, at 181 (describing how local governments successfully fought statewide ballot
initiatives to restrict growth); DANIELSON, supra note 42, at 279–322, 323–47 (noting the
political power of local governments in state capitals). For contrary arguments that local
government lobbying power is weak, see SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER, supra note 19, at 79
(“U.S. cities—individually and collectively—do not appear to exercise significant political
influence as cities. Their ability to achieve the goals that are important to their citizens is
often highly constrained.”).
201
See, e.g., Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7, at 6 (noting the “long
and largely unsuccessful history of efforts to create metropolitan governments”); Briffault,
Boundary Problem, supra note 7, at 1117–20; see also DOWNS, supra note 42, at 170
(“Metropolitan government has almost no political support.”).
202
See Schragger, Federalism, supra note 198, at 1551–52. Of course, even if states
may not be great matches for metropolitan areas, they may still be better than any other
existing alternatives, where cities represent only fragments of the metropolitan area, and
regional governance structures may be minimal or non-existent.
203
In addition, residents of local governments may have a legitimate reliance interest
in the pace of change in their communities, and this factor should receive at least some weight
in the process. See Christopher Serkin, A Case for Zoning, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 749,
783–86 (2020) [hereinafter Serkin, A Case for Zoning].
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level benefits of housing, seems the appropriate choice.204 To facilitate the political
transition to such a new governance structure, one option might be to provide some
additional regulatory or fiscal powers to local governments that agree to enter into
regional partnerships to address housing and planning.205
There are a range of ways to design such a state-level intervention. The state
might set targets for housing production and require local governments to adjust
their zoning ordinances to ensure that those targets are met.206 The state might allow
individual project proponents to bypass or override the local discretionary review
process for certain kinds of projects, such as projects that meet base zoning
requirements and provide for affordable housing.207 The state might mandate the
elimination of single-family zoning in specific areas around the state.208 The merits
and demerits of specific approaches are beyond the scope of this Article.
Whatever the specific approach, the need seems clear. And this has implications
for disputes not just about the wisdom of state intervention but also its legality. As
noted above, questions about the state’s role in land-use regulation have become
constitutionalized in California, with local governments making arguments and
filing lawsuits claiming that the state has no power in this area, as it is reserved to
local control. Our analysis indicates that these arguments should fail—both as a
matter of policy and also as a matter of law to the extent that there are arguments
that land-use regulation is a local or municipal matter that should be reserved to local
governments. There is a clear state role in land-use decisions, particularly in housing
markets, given their regional importance.209
As an example, consider a state like California where state laws that seek to
preempt local legislation for charter cities in matters that “implicat[e] a municipal
affair” must demonstrate that the state law is advancing a substantial state interest
204
See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 7, at 20 (arguing for only partial
intervention of state into land-use decision-making); Alejandro E. Camacho & Nicholas J.
Marantz, Beyond Preemption, Toward Metropolitan Governance, 39 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 125,
146–161 (2020) (describing options for state-level tailoring of interventions into local landuse regulation).
205
Here, we borrow from proposals along these lines made by Gerald Frug and David
Barron. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 19, at 2379; FRUG & BARRON, supra
note 19, at 212.
206
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584 (West 2021).
207
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 1–30 (West 2021); S.B. 35, 2017–2018
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4).
208
H.B. 2001, 80th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); S.B. 50, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2019).
209
In metropolitan areas with low demand but high local fragmentation—such as St.
Louis or Detroit—our efficiency-based arguments for state intervention likely are not very
powerful. However, equity-based arguments may still be important.
It is also possible that private covenants for subdivisions, enforced by homeowners
associations, would continue to restrict density in many neighborhoods. See Serkin, A Case
for Zoning, supra note 203, at 793–98. State law might override these covenants at least to
some extent, though, at the extreme, this may prompt takings claims. We would also note
that covenants will not restrict denser development in many inner-ring suburbs.
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and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.210 We think state intervention in
land-use regulation to advance housing production is clearly advancing a substantial
state interest, given the large-scale impacts of local constraints on housing
production.211
D. Standardization of Land use
Another key conclusion is the need to make property in urban jurisdictions
suitable for infill development more like a commodity. The wide range of land-use
regulations and permit systems make the process of developing a piece of land—or
redeveloping it—much more complicated than would otherwise occur.212 In many
ways, developers and property owners seeking to redevelop land in infill
jurisdictions have to undertake bespoke, site-specific assessments of their property
rights in order to make an investment decision. That increases transaction costs for
development and reduces the amount of infill development that can occur.
Thus, we advance an important reform for land-use regulation—restricting
local jurisdictions to using a predetermined list of regulations when they construct
their land-use regulatory systems. For instance, local governments might be
authorized to set height limits, floor-to-area ratios, setback requirements, and use
restrictions. They could create exemptions from those rules through variances and
conditional use permits, and they could initiate rezoning processes to change the
zoning map or the rules within zones. But the ability of local governments to come
up with new zoning tools—for instance, restrictions on the casting of shadows by
buildings on neighboring parcels or parks or the imposition of prohibitive fees on
the demolition of existing structures—would be eliminated. Requiring local
governments to operate from a fixed “tool box” of zoning tools is not
unprecedented—in fact, it is precisely how Japan structures its land-use regulatory
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Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 996 (Cal. 1992); see, e.g., Ruegg & Ellsworth v.
City of Berkeley, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021), reh’g denied (May 19,
2021), review denied (July 28, 2021) (holding that state laws intended to limit local
opposition to housing “addresses a matter of statewide concern,” allowing the state to
constitutionally limit cities’ discretion in order to address the ongoing housing crisis);
Coalition Advocating Leg. Hous. Options v. City of Santa Monica, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting the Legislature and courts have declared housing to be a matter
of statewide concern).
211
Under this standard, any intervention must also be narrowly tailored; a range of state
interventions might or might not meet this test.
212
Hills & Schleicher, Affordable City, supra note 25 (calling for greater
standardization and certainty in land-use law because it will help accomplish goals of
transferability and development of property, similar to numerus clausus principle).
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system, and despite highly constrained land availability and population density,
Japan actually has relatively affordable housing and high levels of housing
production.213
Of course, we recognize that circumstances change and new problems will arise
that the land-use regulatory process will need to address. The state could authorize
new tools for use by local governments, whether via legislation or (perhaps more
plausibly and effectively) via administrative review. For instance, local governments
could petition a state agency for approval of new land-use regulatory tools. The
advantage of such a system—even if it does authorize the creation of a significant
range of additional tools—is that it would ensure any new tools would be
standardized in their adoption across the state. It is also more feasible for a state
government review body to evaluate and control the generic tools that local
governments across the state use than for a review body to evaluate the complicated
zoning codes of hundreds of local governments to ensure that they are not
improperly constraining housing production.214
Reducing variability in land-use regulatory structures could not only increase
the amount of infill development, but also help reduce barriers to entry by new
developers who could introduce competition or innovation to the development
process.215 Indeed, states might draw a lesson from national government efforts to
213

See Japanese Zoning, BLOGSPOT: URB. KCHOZE (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://urbankchoze.blogspot.com/2014/04/japanese-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/PE557APW] (informal blog post describing zoning); see also Alan Durning, Yes, Other Countries
Do Housing Better, Case 1: Japan, SIGHTLINE INST. (Mar. 25, 2021, 3:44 PM),
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This latter scenario is the one that currently applies in California, where the state is
supposed to review local government plans for housing to ensure that they provide adequate
zoning to meet the local jurisdiction’s fair share of housing demand. Housing Elements, CAL.
DEP’T HOUS. CMTY. DEV., https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housingelement/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/4BBG-PGEG] (last visited Jul. 23, 2021). That
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significant improvements.
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An example of the kind of innovations that might occur are start-up businesses in
southern California that have developed a new business model for the construction of
accessory dwelling units (ADUs) – small additional residential units built on lots that already
have a primary housing unit, often called granny flats or in-law units, and often occupying
converted garages. Bonnie Tsui, Empty Garages; The Answer to California’s Housing
Shortage? N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/realestate/ad
u-empty-garages-california-housing-shortage.html [https://perma.cc/DC7X-JLUX] (last
updated Feb. 12, 2021). Traditionally, the landowner would undertake the development
process for an ADU by hiring a contractor/architect, working through the planning process,
and perhaps most importantly, fronting the money (or borrowing the money) for the
development. Id. This limits ADU construction to property owners with ready access to
capital. Id. These new start-ups offer to finance the ADU project themselves in return for
sharing the rental income from the ADU with the homeowner. Id. This has the potential to
greatly expand the property owners who can construct ADUs, thus facilitating densification
of single-family neighborhoods with relatively affordable housing units.
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harmonize regulatory standards to facilitate international trade. The goal is not to
weaken standards but to make them more interoperable, facilitating transactions that
might otherwise not occur. Some evidence indicates that this might make a
difference—metropolitan areas with more fragmented local government systems on
average have developers that are smaller in size, implying that developers are limited
in their ability to expand by jurisdictional barriers.216
Land use standardization also could reduce the ability of local government to
evade state-level intervention. At the moment, state intervention in land-use
regulation can take on an element of “whack-a-mole” as local governments respond
to state efforts to facilitate development by creating new regulatory obstacles to that
development. For instance, in California, the state has sought to facilitate the
construction of accessory dwelling units (ADUs), which are smaller secondary units
built on lots that already have a primary residence. ADUs have the potential to allow
increased density in single-family neighborhoods with limited impacts and also
create affordable housing in high opportunity zones. Unfortunately, initial state
efforts ran into significant local resistance, as local governments imposed new
requirements on ADUs to replace those streamlined or prohibited by state law.217
More recent state efforts have been more comprehensive, creating a default, uniform
state-wide permitting program for many ADUs that supersedes local legislation.218
This kind of standardization limits the number of regulatory tools available to local
governments, making it easier for the state to supervise what local governments are
doing and prevent evasion. It also limits the possibility of evasion in the first place
by reducing the scope of options that local governments can use to regulate. Indeed,
if the state has a role in approving the use of new regulatory tools, as we describe
above, this would allow the state to police and prevent local evasion of just this sort.
An additional benefit of state-level review and control of land-use regulatory
tools is that the state could limit the amount of discretion that any land-use regulatory
tool contains. For instance, states may mandate that only certain factors are
considered in permit review processes or that factors be clearly specified ex ante. As
noted in Section I.B., discretionary application by local governments of vague
provisions in their zoning code is a key way that local governments retain veto power
over developments, and this is a key way in which local land-use regulation makes
property less of a commodity. One study of land-use regulation in selected California
jurisdictions found that most jurisdictions required discretionary review for any
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housing development of five units or more, and only one city (Los Angeles) had any
significant production of housing without discretionary review.219
Giving the local government (and by extension, the community) the ability to
veto development decisions has been framed by land-use scholars as expanding the
range of parties who have property rights over individual parcels of land.220 This
expansion of the range of parties with a say over development at the extreme can
produce anti-commons outcomes, in which the large number of rights-holders for a
particular piece of property prevent agreements about how to change the use of that
property, even when such changes would be socially optimal.221
State-level review can be an important check on local efforts to broadly expand
discretionary review. This is not to say that we advocate for complete elimination of
discretionary review. Changes will have to carefully balance facilitating infill
development crucial for climate, affordability, and equity goals without
undermining those goals indirectly. For instance, facilitation of development in infill
areas should not facilitate sprawl, car-dependent development that would undermine
climate goals. Likewise, facilitation of infill development by reduction of the
number of discretionary review steps should not undermine the power that
historically underprivileged communities have recently achieved through organizing
efforts.
V. CONCLUSION: THE URGENCY OF CHANGE
There is real urgency to adopt these changes and move more decision-making
power away from local governments to states. As noted in the Introduction,
resolving the obstacles that local control poses to infill development in urban and
suburban areas is essential for economic, environmental, and equity reasons. We
cannot effectively address the housing crisis in our metropolitan areas without
significant increases in housing supply, for which local control is a serious obstacle.
Without addressing local control, particularly in exclusive suburban communities,
we will not address the disproportionate burdens that both the skyrocketing housing
prices of the present and the historical legacy of racial and class segregation have
219

See O’Neill-Hutson et al., supra note 119.
See, e.g., FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS supra note 102, at 77
(characterizing zoning as a collective property right that has high transaction costs, in the
form of hearings and public participation rights, to resolve). See also Fischel, Evolution of
Zoning, supra note 50, at 261; Katherine L. Einstein, David Glick & Maxwell Palmer, The
Politics of Delay in Local Politics: How Institutions Empower Individuals (Apr. 3, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors) (arguing that empowering neighbors to
oppose projects increases the number of veto points for a project and increases delay); Calfee
et al., supra note 126, at 6 (stating that a project proposal “amount[s] to a petition by the
developer, issued to the neighbors and voters of that locality” that is “[i]n effect, the
developer . . . petitioning for the right to alter the built environment”).
221
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: A Concise Introduction and
Lexicon, 76 MOD. L. REV. 6, 9 (2013); Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668–69 (1998).
220

2022]

SMALL SUBURBS, LARGE LOTS

61

had on lower-income residents and residents of color. And without addressing local
control, we will not open up our cities and suburbs to the infill development that
would mitigate climate change. All of these issues are of urgency today—millions
of Americans are rent-burdened, and thousands upon thousands are homeless, in
large part because of our housing crisis; addressing present and historical inequities
is a moral obligation of the present; and every year that we fail to address the
greenhouse gas emissions from transportation, we place a greater burden on future
generations.
This urgency means action must happen now, and fast. But as noted above, it
also doesn’t mean that all local control should be stripped away. Local governments
can play important roles in managing and preventing displacement from new
development, in taking context-specific steps needed to address historical inequities
and injustice, and managing growth in ways that both recognize local preferences
while still meeting the needs for additional housing. A variety of approaches might
help ensure equity is a core component of any interventions to advance housing
production. A non-exhaustive list of possibilities includes: protections against new
projects directly displacing existing tenants, particularly low-income tenants;222
requirements that projects receiving streamlined approval processes provide a
minimum amount of affordable housing;223 state upzoning legislation that
distinguishes
between
neighborhoods
with
different
socioeconomic
characteristics;224 and state legislation that provides greater leeway to local
governments that achieve production of low-income housing, thereby providing
incentives for local governments to advance affordable housing production.225
We also recognize that restructuring local control is a necessary, but not
sufficient, step to addressing the intertwined issues of housing costs, equity, and
climate that connect to urban and suburban infill development. Other steps are
required, such as greater public investment in affordable housing and efforts to
invest in the transit and other infrastructure needed to support infill development and
reduce car-dependency.226 Importantly, a move to greater state involvement must be
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careful not to replicate the flaws of local decision-making or to reproduce historical
inequalities in representation and power.
Nonetheless, we think the task of reframing local control over land use is central
to all of these steps. It may not be sufficient, but it is necessary. Governors,
legislatures, and courts should heed the call.

